Publikationsansicht

Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing (2008)

Abstract
Abstract. As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for load balancing on related machines. We also give tight bounds for k-strong equilibria, where the size of a deviating coalition is at most k, for unrelated machines.

Details der Publikation
Download http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.75.3660
Quelle http://www.math.tau.ac.il/~haimk/papers/spoaWork.pdf
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Archiv CiteSeerX - Scientific Literature Digital Library and Search Engine (United States)
Keywords Key words, Game theory, Strong Nash equilibria, Load balancing, Price of Anarchy
Typ text
Sprache Englisch
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