Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma ∗ Takako (2009)
Masahiro Okuno-fujiwara, Juuso Välimäki, Akihiko Matsui, Chiaki Hara, Masahiro Ashiya, Mamoru Kaneko, ...
Ordinary repeated games do not apply to real societies where one can cheat and escape from partners. We formulate a model of endogenous relationships that a player can unilaterally end and start with...
Itzhak Gilboa, David Schmeidler, To Thank Yoav Binyamini, Steven Brams, Didier Dubois, Ilan Eshel, ...
To our families
Policy Reversals and Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Parties (2007)
Centro De, Investigación Económica, César Martinelli, Autónomo México, Akihiko Matsui, Cesar Martinelli Y, ...
We thank Johan Lagerlof for helpful comments. This work was conducted while Martinelli was a faculty member and Matsui was visiting at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid and revised while Matsui...
A Theory of International Currency and Seigniorage Competition (2005)
This paper explicitly considers strategic interaction between governments to study currency competition and its effects on the circulation of currencies and welfare in a two-country, two-currency...
Voice Matters in a Dictator Game (2004)
Yamamori, Tetsuo, Kato, Kazuhiko, Kawagoe, Toshiji, Matsui, Akihiko
We examine a dictator game with a "voice" option in the laboratory. In our experiment, the recipient has an opportunity to state a payoff-irrelevant request for the minimum acceptable offer before...
Network Investment and Competition with Access to Bypass (2004)
Keiichi Hori, Keizo Mizuno, Akihiko Matsui, Yoshiyasu Ono, Dan Sasaki, Akihisa Shibata
This paper examines firms ’ incentives to make irreversible investments under an open access policy with stochastically growing demand. Using a simple model, we derive an access-to-bypass...
"A Theory of International Currency and Seigniorage Competition"
This paper explicitly considers strategic interaction between governments to study currency competition and its effects on the circulation of currencies and welfare in a two-country, two-currency...
"Voice Matters in a Dictator Game"(in Japanese)
Tetsuo Yamamori, Kazuhiko Kato, Toshiji Kawagoe, Akihiko Matsui
We examine a dictator game with a "voice" option in the laboratory. In the dictator game, player 1 dictates how to divide a pie, and player 2 simply receives his/her share, i.e., unlike in an...
Rationalizable Foresight Dynamics: Evolution and Rationalizability
This paper considers a adjustment process in a society with a continuum of agents. Each agent takes an action upon entry and commits to it until he is replaced by his successor at a stochastic point...
Policy Reversals: Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Parties
Cesar Martinelli, Akihiko Matsui
We develop a unidimensional spatial model of two party competition in which parties are better informed than voters about the bliss point of voters. The announced positions of the two parties serve...
Policy Reversals and Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Parties
Cesar Martinelli, Akihiko Matsui
We develop a spatial model of competition between two policy-motivated parties. Parties know a state of the world which determines which policies are desirable for voters, while voters do not. The...
An Approach to Equilibrium Selection
Akihiko Matsui, Kiminori Matsuyama
We consider equilibrium selection in 2x2 bimatrix games with two strict Nash equilibria in a random matching framework. The players seek to maximize the discounted payoffs, but are restricted to make...
This paper presents a model of random matching between individuals chosen from large populations. We assume that the populations and the set of encounters are infinite but countable and that the...
Three classes of models on money closely related to game theoretic models are (i) search theoretic models; (ii) repeated games (in a narrow sense); and (iii) trading post games. This note tries to...
Policy Reversals and Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Parties.
Martinelli, Cesar, Matsui, Akihiko
We develop a spatial model of competition between two policy-motivated parties. The parties know which policies are desirable for voters, while voters do not. The announced positions of the parties...
Inductive Game Theory: Discrimination and Prejudices.
Kaneko, Mamoru, Matsui, Akihiko
This paper proposes a new theory, which we call inductive game theory. In this theory, the individual player does not have a priori knowledge of the structure of the game that he plays repeatedly....
An Approach to Equilibrium Selection
Akihiko Matsui, Kiminori Matsuyama
We consider equilibrium selection in 2x2 bimatrix (both symmetric and asymmetric) games with two strict Nash equilibria by embedding it in a dynamic random matching game played by a continuum of...
Toward a Theory of International Currency.
Matsuyama, Kiminori, Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, Matsui, Akihiko
The authors use the framework of random matching games and develop a two-country model of the world economy in which two national currencies compete and may be circulated as media of exchange. There...
Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in Repeated Games Nongeneric?
Roger Lagunoff, Akihiko Matsui
Folk Theorems in repeated games hold fixed the game payoffs, while the discount factor is varied freely. We show that these results may be sensitive to the order of limits in situations where players...
A THEORY OF MONEY AND MARKETPLACES
Akihiko Matsui, Takashi Shimizu
This article considers an infinitely repeated economy with divisible fiat money. The economy has many marketplaces that agents choose to visit. In each marketplace, agents are randomly matched to...
"Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games"
Roger Lagunoff, Akihiko Matsui
The standard model of repeated games assumes perfect synchronization in the timing of decisions between the players. In many natural settings, however, choices are made synchronously so that only one...
Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in Repeated Games Nongeneric?
Roger Lagunoff, Akihiko Matsui
Folk Theorems in repeated games hold fixed the game payoffs, while the discount factor is varied freely. We show that these results may be sensitive to the order of limits in situations where players...
Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory, Communication, and Altruism
Roger Lagunoff, Akihiko Matsui
This paper studies the role of memory and communication in games between ongoing organizations. In each organization, each individual, upon entry into the game, replaces his predecessor who has the...
Fiat Money and Public Goods Provision
This paper studies how government uses inflation tax to finance public goods affects the circulation of a national currency in a two-country search theoretic model. Each country consists of...
"A Theory of Money with Market Places"
Akihiko Matsui, Takashi Shimizu
This paper considers an infinitely repeated economy in which divisible fiat money is used to trade goods. The economy has many market places. In each period, each agent chooses a market place,...
"Voice Matters in a Dictator Game"
Tetsuo Yamamori, Kazuhiko Kato, Toshiji Kawagoe, Akihiko Matsui
We examine a dictator game with a "voice" option in the laboratory. In our experiment, the recipient has an opportunity to state a payoff-irrelevant request for the minimum acceptable offer before...
"Policy Reversals: A Democratic Nixon and a Republican Clinton"
Cesar Martinelli, Akihiko Matsui
We develop a model in which political parties but not voters are informed about which policies induce the optimal outcome for the voters. Policies can be located on the real life. Parties are...
Evolution and Interaction of Social Norms
Matsui, Akihiko, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara
We use the framework of random matching games and develop a two society model to analyze the interaction of societies with different social norms. Each agent repeatedly faces two different...
"Strong Currency and Weak Currency"
This paper presents a two-country model in which two currencies compete with each other. There exists an equilibrium in which the two currencies with different rates of inflation circulate as media...
Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in repeated games nongeneric?
Akihiko Matsui, Roger Lagunoff
Folk Theorems in repeated games hold fixed the game payoffs, while the discount factor is varied freely. We show that these results may be sensitive to the order of limits in situations where players...
Evolution in Mechanisms for Public Projects.
Lagunoff, Roger D, Matsui, Akihiko
This paper considers the explicit, real time dynamic processes in which cooperation emerges in a class of binary decision mechanisms, each of which determines funding for a public project. This class...
Organizations and overlapping generations games: Memory, communication, and altruism
Roger Lagunoff, Akihiko Matsui
This paper studies the role of memory and communication in overlapping generations (OLG) games between ongoing organizations. In each organization, each individual, upon entry into the game, replaces...
Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory, Communication, and Altruism
Roger Lagunoff, Akihiko Matsui
This paper studies the role of memory and communication in games between ongoing organizations. In each organization, each individual, upon entry into the game, replaces his predecessor who has the...
A Model of Fiat Money and Barter
We present an infinite horizon model with capital in which fiat money and barter are two competing means of payment. Fiat money has value because barter is limited by the extent of a double...
Voice matters in a dictator game
Tetsuo Yamamori, Kazuhiko Kato, Toshiji Kawagoe, Akihiko Matsui
Communication, Voice, Dictator game, Economic experiment, C72, C91, D64,
A theory of international currency: Competition and discipline
We explicitly consider strategic interaction between governments to study currency competition and its effects on the circulation of currencies and welfare in a two-country two-currency...