Alberto Alesina

Social Science Research Network at: (2009)

Alberto Alesina, Alberto Alesina

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Comments and Discussion (2008)

Alberto Alesina, David Romer

Brookings Papers on Economic Activity - 2008, 1

Goodbye Europa (2008)

Alesina, Alberto

Goodbye Europa, cronache di un declino economico e politico, Alberto Alesina, Francesco Giavazzi. . - [Milano], BUR. c2008.

The Power of the Family 1 (2006)

Alberto Alesina, Paola Giuliano

We study the importance of culture, as measured by the strenght of family ties, on economic behavior and attitudes. We define our measure of family ties using individual responses from the World...

Goodbye Europa (2006)

Alesina, Alberto

Goodbye Europa, cronache di un declino economico e politico, Alberto Alesina, Francesco Giavazzi. . - Milano, Rizzoli, 2006.

Bureaucrats or Politicians? ∗ (2004)

Alberto Alesina, Guido Tabellini, Timothy Besley, Ro Lizzeri, Oliver Hart, Alberto Alesina, ...

was initiated while Alesina was visiting IGIER at Bocconi University; he is very grateful for the hospitality. Tabellini thanks CIAR for financial support. The views expressed herein are those of the...

Regulation and Investment (2002)

Alesina, Alberto, Ardagna, Silvia, Nicoletti, Giuseppe, Schiantarelli, Fabio

One commonly held view about the difference between continental European countries and other OECD economies, especially the United States, is that the heavy regulation of the former reduces their...

Optimal currency areas (2002)

Alesina, Alberto, Barro, Robert J., Tenreyro, Silvana

As the number of independent countries increases and their economies become more integrated, we would expect to observe more multi-country currency unions. This paper explores the pros and cons for...

Optimal currency areas (2002)

Alesina, Alberto, Barro, Robert J., Tenreyro, Silvana

As the number of independent countries increases and their economies become more integrated, we would expect to observe more multi-country currency unions. This paper explores the pros and cons for...

© notice, is given to the source. The Political Economy of International Unions (2001)

Alberto Alesina, Ignazio Angeloni, Federico Etro, Massimo Bordignon, Chris Foote, ...

support and acknowledges financial support from Fondazione Luigi Einaudi. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research or...

Fiscal Policy, Profits, and Investment (1999)

Alesina, Alberto, Ardagna, Silvia, Perotti, Roberto, Schiantarelli, Fabio

This paper evaluates the effects of fiscal policy on investment using a panel of OECD countries. In particular, we investigate how different types of fiscal policy affect profits and , as a result,...

Income Distribution, Political Instability and Investment (1995)

Alesina, Alberto, Perotti, Roberto

This paper successfully tests on a sample of 71 countries for the period 1960-85 the following hypotheses. Income inequality, by fueling social discontent, increases socio-political instability. The...

Fiscal Expansion and Adjustments in OECD Countries (1995)

Alesina, Alberto, Perotti, Roberto

In several countries policymakers are striving to improve the budget balance. Trivially, this can be done by raising taxes and/or cutting expenditures. But the two strategies are not equivalent. In...

The Italian Budget Procedures: Analysis and Proposals (1995)

Alesina, Alberto, Mare, Mauro, Perotti, Roberto

One of the main arguments of this paper is that complexity, lack of transparency, and convoluted laws and regulations make it very difficult to handle the Italian public finances and make debt...

Economic Risk and Political Risk in Fiscal Unions (1995)

Alesina, Alberto, Perotti, Roberto

A fiscal program that redistributes income from rich to poor individuals indirectly redistributes tax revenues from regions hit by a favorable shock to regions hit by an unfavorable one. Centralized...

Reducing Budget Deficits (1995)

Alesina, Alberto, Perotti, Roberto

This paper compares the evidence concerning successful versus unsuccessful fiscal adjustments, where success is defined in terms of achieving a lasting debt reduction. The goal is to understand from...

Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin America", OCE working paper (1995)

Alberto Alesina, Ricardo Hausmann, Rudolf Hommes, Ernesto Stein

In this paper we collect detailed information on the budget institutions of Latin American countries. We classify these institutions on a “hierarchical”/“collegial ” scale, as a function of...

Income Distribution, Political Instability and Investment (1992)

Alesina, Alberto, Perotti, Roberto

This paper successfully tests on a sample of 72 countries for the periods 1960-85 and 1970-85 the following hypotheses. Income inequality, by fueling social discontent, increases socio-political...

RULES AND DISCRETION WITH NONCOORDINATED MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES (1987)

ALESINA, ALBERTO, TABELLINI, GUIDO

The time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy is due to the effects of tax distortions. Thus the issue of how to improve upon the time-consistent suboptimal monetary policy is related to that of...

Bureaucrats or Politicians?

Alberto Alesina, Guido Tabellini

Policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats. This paper investigates the e fficiency criteria for allocating policy tasks to elected policymakers (politicians) or non elected...

Corruption, Inequality and Fairness

Alberto Alesina, George-Marios Angeletos

Bigger governments raise the possibilities for corruption; more corruption may in turn raise the support for redistributive policies that intend to correct the inequality and injustice generated by...

The Influence of Political Distortions on Economic Performance

Alberto Alesina, Brian Snowdon

Alberto Alesina is the Nathaniel Ropes Professor of Political Economy and Chairman of the Department of Economics at Harvard University. In this interview he discusses with Brian Snowdon his views on...

Work and Leisure in the U.S. and Europe: Why So Different?

Alberto Alesina, Edward L. Glaeser, Bruce Sacerdote

Americans average 25.1 working hours per person in working age per week, but the Germans average 18.6 hours. The average American works 46.2 weeks per year, while the French average 40 weeks per...

Choosing Electoral Rules: Theory and Evidence from US Cities

Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, Francesco Trebbi

This paper studies the choice of electoral rules, in particular, the question of minority representation. Majorities tend to disenfranchise minorities through strategic manipulation of electoral...

Who Adjusts and When? On the Political Economy of Reforms

Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, Francesco Trebbi

Why do countries delay stabilizations of large and increasing budget deficits and inflation? And what explains the timing of reforms? We use the war of attrition model as a guidance for our empirical...

The European Union: A Politically Incorrect View

Alberto Alesina, Roberto Perotti

In this paper, we present our view of the recent evolution of European integration. We first briefly describe the main features of the institution and decision making process in the European Union,...

Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance

Alberto Alesina, Eliana La Ferrara

We survey and assess the literature on the positive and negative effects of ethnic diversity on economic policies and outcomes. Our focus is on both focus both cities in developed countries (the US)...

Why Do Politicians Delegate?

Alberto Alesina, Guido Tabellini

Opportunistic politicians maximize the probability of reelection and rents from office holding. Can it be optimal from their point of view to delegate policy choices to independent bureaucracies? The...

Technology and Labor Regulations

Alberto Alesina, Joseph Zeira

Many low skilled jobs have been substituted away for machines in Europe, or eliminated, much more so than in the US, while technological progress at the "top," i.e., at the high-tech sector, is...

Divorce, Fertility and the Shot Gun Marriage

Alberto Alesina, Paola Giuliano

Using the birth certificates data from the Vital Statistics of the USA between 1968 and 1999, we construct state level panel data of different measures of fertility and examine the change in divorce...

Why Doesn't The US Have a European-Style Welfare State?

Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser, Bruce Sacerdote

European countries are much more generous to the poor relative to the US level of generosity. Economic models suggest that redistribution is a function of the variance and skewness of the pre-tax...

What Does the European Union Do?

Alberto Alesina, Ignazio Angeloni, Ludger Schuknecht

We construct a set of indicators to measure the policy-making role of the European Union (European Council, Parliament, Commission, Court of Justice, etc. ), in a selected number of policy domains....

Preferences for Redistribution in the Land of Opportunities

Alberto Alesina, Eliana La Ferrara

The poor favor redistribution and the rich oppose it, but that is not all. Social mobility may make some of today’s poor into tomorrow’s rich and since redistributive policies do not change...

War, Peace and the Size of Countries

Enrico Spolaore, Alberto Alesina

This paper studies the relationship between international con‡ict and the size distribution of countries in a model in which both peaceful bargain-ing and non-peaceful confrontations are possible....

Inequality and Happiness: Are Europeans and Americans Different?

Alberto Alesina, Rafael Di Tella, Robert MacCulloch

The answer to the question posed in the title is “yes. ” Using a total of 128,106 answers to a survey question about “happiness,” we find that there is a large, negative and significant...

The Political Economy of International Unions

Alberto Alesina, Ignazio Angeloni, Federico Etro

We model an international union as a group of countries deciding together the provision of certain public goods and policies because of spillovers. The countries are heterogeneous either in...

Institutional Rules for Federations

Alberto Alesina, Ignazio Angeloni, Federico Etro

We study the organization of federations — or international unions — which decide together the provision of certain public goods. The benefit of centralization depends on the internalization of...

Political Jurisdictions in Heterogeneous Communities

Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir, Caroline Hoxby

We investigate the number and size of local political jurisdictions are determined, by focusing on the tradeoff between the benefits of economies of scale and the costs of a heterogeneous population....

Optimal Currency Areas

Alberto Alesina, Robert Barro, Silvana Tenreyro

As the number of independent countries increases and their economies become more integrated, we would expect to observe more multi-country currency unions. This paper explores the pros and cons for...

Fractionalization

Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, Romain Wacziarg

We provide new measures of ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization for about 190 countries. These measures are more comprehensive than those previously used in the economics literature and...

The Size of Countries: Does it Matter?

Alberto Alesina

Borders are a man made institution, and as such their shape cannot be taken as part of the physical landscape. The size of countries is endogenous to politico economic forces. This paper discusses...

Fairness and Redistribution: US versus Europe

Alberto Alesina, George-Marios Angeletos

Different beliefs about how fair social competition is and what determines income inequality, influence the redistributive policy chosen democratically in a society. But the composition of income in...

Trade, Growth, and the Size of Countries

Alberto Alesina, Enrico Spolaore, Romain Wacziarg

Normally, economists take the size of countries as an exogenous variable which does need to be explained. Nevertheless, the borders of countries and therefore their size change, partially in response...

International Unions

Alberto Alesina, Ignazio Angeloni, Federico Etro

We model an international union as a group of countries deciding together on the provision of public goods or policies that generate spillovers across members. The trade-off between benefits of...

Choosing (And Reneging On) Exchange Rate Regimes

Alberto Alesina, Alexander Wagner

We use data on announced and actual exchange rate arrangements to ask which countries follow de facto regimes different from their de iure ones, that is, do not do what they say. Our results suggest...

Bureaucrats or Politicians?

Alberto Alesina, Guido Tabellini

Policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats. This paper investigates the criteria that should lead a society to allocate policy tasks to elected policymakers (politicians) or non...

Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance

Alberto Alesina, Eliana La Ferrara

We survey and asses the literature on the positive and negative e?ects of ethnic diversity on economic policies and outcomes. Our focus is on countries, on cities in developed countries (the US) and...

The European Union: A Politically Incorrect View

Alberto Alesina, Roberto Perotti

In this paper, we present our view of the recent evolution of European integration. We first briefly describe the main features of the institution and decision making process in the European Union,...

Choosing Electoral rules: Theory and Evidence from US Cities

Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, Francesco Trebbi

This paper studies the choice of electoral rules, in particular the question of minority representation. Majorities tend to disenfranchise minorities through strategic manipulation of electoral...

Work and Leisure in the U. S. and Europe: Why so Different?

Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser, Bruce Sacerdote

Americans average 25. 1 working hours per person in working age per week, but the Germans average 18. 6 hours. The average American works 46. 2 weeks per year, while the French average 40 weeks per...

Corruption, Inequality and Fairness

Alberto Alesina, George-Marios Angeletos

Bigger governments raise the possibilities for corruption; more corruption may in turn raise the support for redistributive policies that intend to correct the inequality and injustice generated by...

Good bye Lenin (or not?): The effect of Communism on people's preferences

Alberto Alesina, Nicola Fuchs-Schundeln

Preferences for redistribution, as well as the generosities of welfare states, differ significantly across countries. In this paper, we test whether there exists a feedback process of the economic...

Why do Politicians Delegate?

Alberto Alesina, Guido Tabellini

Opportunistic politicians maximize the probability of reelection and rents from office holding. Can it be optimal from their point of view to delegate policy choices to independent bureaucracies? The...

Why is fiscal policy often procyclical?

Alberto Alesina, Guido Tabellini

Many countries, especially developing ones, follow procyclical fiscal polices, namely spending goes up (taxes go down) in booms and spending goes down (taxes go up) in recessions. We provide an...

Who adjusts and when? On the political economy of reforms

Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, Francesco Trebbi

Why do countries delay stabilizations of large and increasing budget deficits and inflation? And what explains the timing of reforms? We use the war of attrition model as a guidance for our empirical...

Artificial States

Alberto Alesina, William Easterly, Janina Matuszeski

Artificial states are those in which political borders do not coincide with a division of nationalities desired by the people on the ground. We propose and compute for all countries in the world two...

Divorce, fertility and the shot gun marriage

Alberto Alesina, Paola Giuliano

Using the birth certificates data from the Vital Statistics of the USA between 1968 and 1999, we construct state level panel data of different measures of fertility and examine the change in divorce...

Who Adjusts and When?The Political Economy of Reforms

Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, Francesco Trebbi

Why do countries delay stabilizations of large and increasing budget deficits and inflation? And what explains the timing of reforms? We use the war-of-attrition model to guide our empirical study on...

An Overlapping Generations Model of Electoral Competition

Alberto Alesina, Stephen E. Spear

This paper presents a dynamic model of political competition between two "parties" with different policy preferences. A "party" is explicitly modeled as a sequence of overlapping generations of...

The Politics of Ambiguity

Alberto Alesina, Alex Cukierman

Politicians have generally two motives: they wish to hold office as long as possible and wish to implement their preferred policies. Thus they face a trade-off between the policies which maximize...

External Debt, Capital Flight and Political Risk

Alberto Alesina, Guido Tabellini

This paper provides an explanation of the simultaneous occurrence of large accumulation of external debt, private capital outflow and relatively low domestic capital formation in developing...

Public Confidence and Debt Management: A Model and A Case Study of Italy

Alberto Alesina, Alessandro Prati, Guido Tabellini

High debt countries may face the risk of self-fulfilling debt crises. If the public expects that in the future the government will be unable to roll over the maturing debt, they may refuse to buy...

Political Instability and Economic Growth

Alberto Alesina, Sule Ozler, Nouriel Roubini, Phillip Swagel

This paper investigates the relationship between political instability and per capita GDP growth in a sample of 113 countries for the period 1950-1982. We define ?political instability? as the...

Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy

Alberto Alesina, Howard Rosenthal

The post-war United States exhibits two rather strong politico-economic regularities. The political regularity is that the party of the President has always lost votes in aid-term Congressional...

Voting on the Budget Deficit

Alberto Alesina, Guido Tabellini

This paper analyzes a model in which different rational individuals vote over the composition and time profile of public spending. Potential disagreement between current and future majorities...

Moderating Elections

Alberto Alesina, Howard Rosenthal

This paper extends the spatial theory of voting to an institutional structure in which policy choices are a function of the composition of the legislature and of the executive. In an insti tutional...

Democracy, Technology, and Growth

Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, Francesco Trebbi

We explore the question of how political institutions and particularly democracy affect economic growth. Although empirical evidence of a positive effect of democracy on economic performance in the...

What Does the European Union Do?

Alberto Alesina, Ignazio Angeloni, Ludger Schuknecht

Treaty on European Union; political economy; subsidiarity; fiscal federalism

International Unions

Alberto Alesina, Ignazio Angeloni, Federico Etro

We model an international union as a group of countries deciding to centralize the provision of public goods, or policies, that generate externalities across union members. The trade-off between the...

Fairness and Redistribution

Alberto Alesina, George-Marios Angeletos

Different beliefs about the fairness of social competition and what determines income inequality influence the redistributive policy chosen in a society. But the composition of income in equilibrium...

Fiscal Policy, Profits, and Investment

Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, Roberto Perotti, Fabio Schiantarelli

This paper evaluates the effects of fiscal policy on investment using a panel of OECD countries. We find a sizeable negative effect of public spending—and in particular of its wage component—on...

The Welfare State and Competitiveness.

Alesina, Alberto, Perotti, Roberto

In all industrial countries, fiscal policy is increasingly about redistribution. In this paper, the authors study redistribution across different types of agents in a world characterized by the...

The Political Economy of the Budget Surplus in the United States

Alberto Alesina

Current surpluses in the U.S. have been achieved by a combination of a strong economy, low interest rates, and sharp cuts in defense spending. These surpluses follow a period (the 1980s) of rather...

Political models of macroeconomic policy and fiscal reform

Alesina, Alberto

The author explains how recent developments in political economics improve our understanding of macroeconomic policy - especially the timing, design, and likelihood of stabilization's success through...

Goodbye Lenin (or Not?): The Effect of Communism on People

Alberto Alesina, Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln

Preferences for redistribution, as well as the generosity of welfare states, differ significantly across countries. This paper tests whether there exists a feedback process of the economic regime on...

Gender Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores

Alberto Alesina, Andrea Ichino, Loukas Karabarbounis

Gender Based Taxation (GBT) satisfies Ramsey’s optimal criterion by taxing less the more elastic labor supply of (married) women. This holds when different elasticities between men and women are...

Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task

Alberto Alesina, Guido Tabellini

This paper investigates the normative criteria that guide the allocation of a policy task to an elected politician versus an independent bureaucrat. The bureaucrat is preferable for technical tasks...

A Theory of Divided Government.

Alesina, Alberto, Rosenthal, Howard

This paper extends the spatial theory of voting to the case in which policy choices depend upon the interaction between executive and the legislature. Voters are strategic and to analyze equilibrium...

Economic Integration and Political Disintegration

Alberto Alesina, Enrico Spolaore, Romain Wacziarg

In a world of trade restrictions, large countries enjoy economic benefits, because political boundaries determine the size of the market. Under free trade and global markets even relatively small...

Voting on the Budget Deficit.

Tabellini, Guido, Alesina, Alberto

This paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending. All voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimal....

Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance

Alberto Alesina, Eliana La Ferrara

We survey and assess the literature on the positive and negative effects of ethnic diversity on economic policies and outcomes. Our focus is on communities of different size and organizational...

The European Union: A Politically Incorrect View

Alberto Alesina, Roberto Perotti

In this paper, we present our view of the recent evolution of European integration. We first briefly describe the main features of the institution and decision making process in the European Union,...

The Power of the Family

Alberto Alesina, Paola Giuliano

The structure of family relationships influences economic behavior and attitudes. We define our measure of family ties using individual responses from the World Value Survey regarding the role of the...

The Political Economy of Growth: A Critical Survey of the Recent Literature.

Alesina, Alberto, Perotti, Roberto

This article reviews the recent literature on the political economy of growth, focusing on the research that has developed at the intersection of the endogenous growth literature and the new...

The Political Economy of Budget Deficits

Alberto Alesina, Roberto Perotti

Political economy , Budget deficits , Budgetary policy , Debt , Economic models ,

Rules and Discretion with Noncoordinated Monetary and Fiscal Policies.

Alesina, Alberto, Tabellini, Guido

The time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy is due to the effects of tax distortions. Thus, the issue of how to im prove upon the time-consistent suboptimal monetary policy is related to that...

Fractionalization

Wacziarg, Romain, Alesina, Alberto, Devleeschauwer, Arnaud, Easterly, William, Kurlat, Sergio

We provide new measures of ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization for about 190 countries. These measures are more comprehensive than those previously used in the economics literature and...

Bureaucrats or politicians? Part II: Multiple policy tasks

Alesina, Alberto, Tabellini, Guido

Policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats. This paper investigates first the normative criteria with which to allocate policy tasks to elected policymakers (politicians) or...

Segregation and the Quality of Government in a Cross-Section of Countries

Alberto Alesina, Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

This paper has three goals. The first (and perhaps the most important one) is to provide a new compilation of data on ethnic, linguistic and religious composition at the sub-national level for a...

Fiscal Adjustment, The Real Exchange Rate and Australia's External Imbalance

Alberto Alesina, Matthew T. Jones

This article examines issues of relevance to Australia's external imbalance. We investigate the sharp fiscal consolidation over the past five years and examine why it did not reduce the current...

Why is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?

Alberto Alesina, Filipe R. Campante, Guido Tabellini

Fiscal policy is procyclical in many developing countries. We explain this policy failure with a political agency problem. Procyclicality is driven by voters who seek to "starve the Leviathan" to...

Regulation and Investment

Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, Giuseppe Nicoletti, Fabio Schiantarelli

One commonly held view about the difference between continental European countries and other OECD countries, especially the United States, is that the heavy regulation of Europe reduces its growth....

Welfare Policies in the UNECE Region: Why so Different?

Alberto Alesina

This paper provides the text of the Gunnar Myrdal Lecture presented at the U.N. Palais des Nations in 2006. It provides an analysis of why different countries in the western world have chosen...

Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States, 1948-1984

Alberto Alesina, Jeffrey Sachs

This paper tests the existence and the extent of a politically induced business cycle in the U.S. in the post-World War II period. The cycle described in this paper is different from the traditional...

A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt in a Democracy

Alberto Alesina, Guido Tabellini

This paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences concerning fiscal policy alternate in office as a result of democratic elections. It is shown that in this situation...

Why are Stabilizations Delayed?

Alberto Alesina, Allan Drazen

When a stabilization has significant distributional implications (as in the case of tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit) different socio-economic groups will attempt to shift the burden...

Political Cycles in OECD Economies

Alberto Alesina, Nouriel Roubini

This paper studies whether the dynamic behavior of GNP growth, unemployment and inflation is systematically affected by the timing of elections and of changes of governments. The sample includes the...

A Model of the Political Economy of the United States

Alberto Alesina, John Londregan, Howard Rosenthal

We develop and test a model of joint determination of the rate of economic growth and the results of presidential and Congressional elections in the United States. In our model, economic agents and...

Why Are There So Many Divided Senate Delegations?

Alberto Alesina, Morris Fiorina, Howard Rosenthal

The last three decades have witnessed a sharp increase in the number of states with spilt Senate delegations, featuring two senators of different parties. In addition, there is evidence that senators...

Distributive Politics and Economic Growth

Alberto Alesina, Dani Rodrik

This paper studies the relationship between political conflict and economic growth in a simple model of endogenous growth with distributive conflicts. We study both the case of two "classes" (workers...

Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies

Alberto Alesina, Gerald D. Cohen, Nouriel Roubini

The purpose of this paper is to test for evidence of opportunistic "political business cycles" in a large sample of 18 OECD economies. Our results can be summarized as follows: 1) We find very little...

The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Politics in Europe

Alberto Alesina, Vittorio Grilli

This paper studies how the creation of a European Central Bank (ECB) will change the political economy of monetary policy in Europe. The twelve governors of the national Central Banks of the EEC have...

Menus of Linear Income Tax Schedules

Alberto Alesina, Philippe Weil

Relative to traditional piecewise linear income taxation schemes, it is possible to increase government revenues by offering to consumers a menu of linear income tax schedules. In the resulting...

On the Feasibility of a One or Multi-Speed European Monetary Union

Alberto Alesina, Vittorio Grilli

This paper addresses two questions: (1) Is a twelve country monetary union in Europe feasible; (2) Can monetary union be achieved at multi-speed, i.e., with a rust group of countries going first, and...

The Political Economy of Capital Controls

Alberto Alesina, Vittorio Grilli

This paper calculates international income transfers which implement a Pareto optimal trade equilibrium in a world where many countries trade many goods.

Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment

Alberto Alesina, Roberto Perotti

This paper successfully tests on a sample of 70 countries for the period 1960-85 the following hypotheses. Income inequality, by fueling social discontent, increases socio-political instability. The...

The Political Economy of Budget Deficits

Alberto Alesina, Roberto Perotti

This paper provides a critical survey of the literature on politico-institutional determinants of the government budget. We organize our discussion around two questions: Why did certain OECD...

The Welfare State and Competitiveness

Alberto Alesina, Roberto Perotti

In all modern industrial countries, redistributive expenditures are a larger component of the government budget than consumption of goods and services. In this paper, we use a general equilibrium,...

Economic Risk and Political Risk in Fiscal Unions

Alberto Alesina, Roberto Perotti

A fiscal program that redistributes income from rich to poor individuals indirectly redistributes tax revenues from regions hit by a favorable shock to regions hit by an unfavorable one. Centralized...

On the Number and Size of Nations

Alberto Alesina, Enrico Spolaore

This paper studies the equilibrium determination of the number of political jurisdictions in different political regimes, democratic or not, and in different economic environments, with more or less...

Fiscal Expansions and Fiscal Adjustments in OECD Countries

Alberto Alesina, Roberto Perotti

This paper considers budget expansions and adjustments in OECD countries in the last three decades. Our main results are: i) on average fiscal expansions are the results of increases in expenditures,...

Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions

Alberto Alesina, Roberto Perotti

By discussing the available theoretical and empirical literature, this paper argues that budget procedures and budget institutions do influence budget outcomes. Budget institutions include both...

Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin America

Alberto Alesina, Ricardo Hausmann, Rudolf Hommes, Ernesto Stein

In this paper we collect detailed information on the budget institutions of Latin American countries. We classify these institutions on a `hierarchical'/'collegial' scale, as a function of their...

The Costs and Benefits of Fiscal Rules: Evidence from U.S. States

Alberto Alesina, Tamim Bayoumi

This paper shows that in American states balanced budget rules are effective in enforcing fiscal discipline but they have no costs in terms of increased output variability. More specifically, we show...

International Conflict, Defense Spending and the Size of Countries

Alberto Alesina, Enrico Spolaore

This paper provides a formal model of endogenous country formation and of choice of defense spending in a world with international conflict. The model is consistent with three observations. First,...

Fiscal Adjustments in OECD Countries: Composition and Macroeconomic Effects

Alberto Alesina, Roberto Perotti

This ppaer studies how the composition of fiscal adjustments influences their likelihood of success, defined as a long lasting deficit reduction, and their macroeconomic consequences. We find that...

Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions

Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir, William Easterly

We present a model that links heterogeneity of preferences across ethnic groups in a city to the amount and type of public good the city supplies. We test the implications of the model with three...

Openness, Country Size and the Government

Alberto Alesina, Romain Wacziarg

This paper shows that smaller countries have larger public sectors as a share of GDP, and are also more open to trade. These empirical observations are consistent with recent theoretical models...

Economic Integration and Political Disintegration

Alberto Alesina, Enrico Spolaore, Romain Wacziarg

Trade liberalization and political separatism go hand in hand. In a world of trade restrictions, large countries enjoy economic benefits because political boundaries determine the size of the market....

Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?

Alberto Alesina, David Dollar

This paper studies the pattern of allocation of foreign aid from various donors to receiving countries. We find considerable evidence that the direction of foreign aid is dictated by political and...

Redistributive Public Employment

Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir, William Easterly

Politicians may use disguised' redistributive policies in order to circumvent opposition to explicit tax-transfer schemes. First, we present a theoretical model that formalizes this hypothesis; then...

Is Europe Going Too Far?

Alberto Alesina, Romain Wacziarg

This paper examines the process of European political integration. We start with a political economy model of monetary policy, illustrating a general principle: economic integration requires setting...

Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?

Alberto Alesina, Beatrice Weder

Critics of foreign aid programs argue that these funds often support corrupt governments and inefficient bureaucracies. Supporters argue that foreign aid can be used to reward good governments. This...

Participation in Heterogeneous Communities

Alberto Alesina, Eliana La Ferrara

This paper studies both theoretically and empirically the determinants of group formation and of the degree of participation when the population is heterogeneous, both in terms of income and race or...

Fiscal Policy, Profits, and Investment

Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, Roberto Perotti, Fabio Schiantarelli

This paper evaluates the effects of fiscal policy on investment using a panel of OECD countries. In particular, we investigate how different types of fiscal policy affect profits and , as a result,...

Redistribution Through Public Employment: The Case of Italy

Alberto Alesina, Stephan Danninger, Massimo Rostagno

This paper examines the regional distribution of public employment in Italy. It documents two sets of facts. This first is the use of public employment as a subsidy from the North to the less wealthy...

The Political Economy of the Budget Surplus in the U.S.

Alberto Alesina

Current surpluses in the U.S. have been achieved by a combination of a strong economy, low interest rates, and sharp cuts in defence spending. These surpluses follow a period (the eighties) of rather...

The Determinants of Trust

Alberto Alesina, Eliana La Ferrara

Both individual experiences and community characteristics influence how much people trust each other. Using data drawn from US localities we find that the strongest factors that reduce trust are: i)...

Political Jurisdictions in Heterogeneous Communities

Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir, Caroline Hoxby

We investigate how the number and size of local political jurisdictions in an area is determined. Our model focuses on the tradeoff between the benefits of economies of scale and the costs of a...

Currency Unions

Alberto Alesina, Robert J. Barro

What is the optimal number of currencies in the world? Common currencies affect trading costs and, thereby, the amounts of trade, output, and consumption. From the perspective of monetary policy, the...

Inequality and Happiness: Are Europeans and Americans Different?

Alberto Alesina, Rafael Di Tella, Robert MacCulloch

The answer to the question posed in the title is 'yes.' Using a total of 128,106 answers to a survey question about happiness,' we find that there is a large, negative and significant effect of...

Preferences for Redistribution in the Land of Opportunities

Alberto Alesina, Eliana La Ferrara

The poor favor redistribution and the rich oppose it, but that is not all. Social mobility may make some of today's poor into tomorrow's rich and since redistributive policies do not change often,...

Why Doesn't the US Have a European-Style Welfare System?

Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser, Bruce Sacerdote

European countries are much more generous to the poor relative to the US level of generosity. Economic models suggest that redistribution is a function of the variance and skewness of the pre-tax...

The Political Economy of International Unions

Alberto Alesina, Ignazio Angeloni, Federico Etro

We model an international union as a group of countries deciding together the provision of certain public goods and policies because of spillovers. The countries are heterogeneous either in...

Institutional Rules for Federations

Alberto Alesina, Ignazio Angeloni, Federico Etro

We study the organization of federations - or international unions - which decide together the provision of certain public goods. The benefit of centralization depends on the internalization of the...

What Does the European Union Do?

Alberto Alesina, Ignazio Angeloni, Ludger Schuknecht

We construct a set of indicators to measure the policy-making role of the European Union (European Council, Parliament, Commission, Court of Justice, etc.), in a selected number of policy domains....

Endogenous Political Institutions

Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, Francesco Trebbi

Political institutions influence economic policy, but they are themselves endogenous since they are chosen, in some way, by members of the polity. An important aspect of institutional design is how...

Optimal Currency Areas

Alberto Alesina, Robert J. Barro, Silvana Tenreyro

As the number of independent countries increases and their economies become more integrated, we would expect to observe more multi-country currency unions. This paper explores the pros and cons for...

Fractionalization

Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, Romain Wacziarg

We provide new measures of ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization for about 190 countries. These measures are more comprehensive than those previously used in the economics literature and...

Fairness and Redistribution: U.S. versus Europe

Alberto Alesina, George-Marios Angeletos

Different beliefs about how fair social competition is and what determines income inequality, influence the redistributive policy chosen democratically in a society. But the composition of income in...

Regulation and Investment

Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, Giuseppe Nicoletti, Fabio Schiantarelli

One commonly held view about the difference between continental European countries and other OECD economies, especially the United States, is that the heavy regulation of Europe reduces its growth....

Choosing (and reneging on) exchange rate regimes

Alberto Alesina, Alexander Wagner

We use data on announced and actual exchange rate arrangements to ask which countries follow de facto regimes different from their de iure ones, that is, do not do what they say. Our results suggest...

Why is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?

Alberto Alesina, Guido Tabellini

Many countries, especially developing ones, follow procyclical fiscal polices, namely spending goes up (taxes go down) in booms and spending goes down (taxes go up) in recessions. We provide an...

Good bye Lenin (or not?): The Effect of Communism on People's Preferences

Alberto Alesina, Nichola Fuchs Schuendeln

Preferences for redistribution, as well as the generosities of welfare states, differ significantly across countries. In this paper, we test whether there exists a feedback process of the economic...

Artificial States

Alberto Alesina, William Easterly, Janina Matuszeski

Artificial states are those in which political borders do not coincide with a division of nationalities desired by the people on the ground. We propose and compute for all countries in the world two...

Divorce, Fertility and the Shot Gun Marriage

Alberto Alesina, Paola Giuliano

Total fertility declined in states that introduced unilateral divorce, which makes dissolution of marriage easier. Also the ratio of out-of-wedlock fertility over total declined. We suggest an...

The Power of the Family

Alberto Alesina, Paola Giuliano

The structure of family relationships influences economic behavior and attitudes. We define our measure of family ties using individual responses from the World Value Survey regarding the role of the...

Gender Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores

Alberto Alesina, Andrea Ichino, Loukas Karabarbounis

Gender Based Taxation (GBT) satisfies Ramsey's optimal criterion by taxing less the more elastic labor supply of women. This holds when different elasticities between men and women are taken as...

Political Jurisdictions in Heterogeneous Communities

Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir, Caroline Hoxby

We investigate whether political jurisdictions form in response to the trade-off between economies of scale and the costs of a heterogeneous population. We consider heterogeneity in income, race,...

Segregation and the Quality of Government in a Cross-Section of Countries

Alberto Alesina, Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

This paper has three goals. The first, and perhaps the most important, is to provide a new compilation of data on ethnic, linguistic and religious composition at the sub-national level for a large...

The Euro and Structural Reforms

Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, Vincenzo Galasso

This paper investigates whether or not the adoption of the Euro has facilitated the introduction of structural reforms, defined as deregulation in the product markets and liberalization and...

The Euro and Structural Reforms

Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, Vincenzo Galasso

This paper investigates whether or not the adoption of the Euro has facilitated the introduction of structural reforms, defined as deregulation in the product markets and liberalization and...

Preferences for Redistribution

Alesina, Alberto, Giuliano, Paola

This paper discusses what determines the preferences of individuals for redistribution. We review the theoretical literature and provide a framework to incorporate various effects previously studied...

Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance

Alberto Alesina, Eliana La Ferrara

We survey and assess the literature on the positive and negative effects of ethnic diversity on economic policies and outcomes. Our focus is on communities of different size and organizational...

Institutional Reforms: The Case of Colombia

Alberto Alesina

These studies of Colombian economic, political, and social institutions offer not only theoretically grounded analyses but also practical recommendations for policy reform. Experts from the United...

Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy

Alberto Alesina, Nouriel Roubini, Gerald D. Cohen

The relationship between political and economic cycles is one of the most widely studied topics in political economics. This book examines how electoral laws, the timing of elections, the ideological...

Family Ties and Political Participation

Alesina, Alberto, Giuliano, Paola

We establish an inverse relationship between family ties, generalized trust and political participation. The more individuals rely on the family as a provider of services, insurance, transfer of...

The Choice of Institutions

Alberto Alesina

Verfassung, Wahlsystem, Politische Partei, Constitution, Electoral system , Political party

The evolution of ideology, fairness and redistribution

Alberto Alesina, Guido Cozzi, Noemi Mantovan

Ideas about what is "fair" above and beyond the individuals' position in the income ladder determine preferences for redistribution. We study the dynamic evolution of different economies in which...