Wonseok Choi, Jung-wook Kim, Andrei Shleifer, Guidance We, ...
In this paper, we develop a simple model in which trading volume contains information about future stock returns. Specifically, our model explains why high trading volume is observed when a firm...
Marianne Bertrand, Sendhil Mullainathan, Marianne Bertrand, Sendhil Mullainathan, Marianne Bertrand, Associate Professor, ...
The results in this paper were previously circulated as part of a larger working paper entitled “Do CEOs Set Their Own Pay? The Ones without Principals Do.” For their very helpful comments, we...
The Unofficial Economy and Economic Development (2009)
Rafael La Porta, Andrei Shleifer
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity - 2008, 2
Regulation and Distrust (2009)
Aghion, Philippe, Algan, Yann, Cahuc, Pierre, Shleifer, Andrei
In a cross-section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with social capital. We document this correlation, and present a model explaining it. In the model, distrust...
Regulation and Distrust (2009)
Aghion, Philippe, Algan, Yann, Cahuc, Pierre, Shleifer, Andrei
In a cross-section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with social capital. We document this correlation, and present a model explaining it. In the model, distrust...
THE SURVIVAL OF NOISE TRADERS IN FINANCIAL MARKETS * (2008)
J. Bradford, De Long, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers, Robert J. Waldmann
and European University Institute, respectively We present a model of portfolio allocation by noise traders with incorrect expectations about return variances. For such misperceptions, noise traders...
Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets (2008)
J. Bradford, De Long, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers, Robert J. Waldmann
We present a simple overlapping generations model of an asset market in which irrational noise traders with erroneous stochastic beliefs both affect prices and earn higher expected returns. The...
The value of a statistical life and the coefficient of relative risk aversion (2008)
Steven Shavell, Andrei Shleifer, The John, Louis Kaplow, Louis Kaplow, ...
expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic
2004, A catering theory of dividends (2008)
Malcolm Baker, Jeffrey Wurgler, Raj Aggarwal, Katharine Baker, Y Cohen, Xavier Gabaix, ...
financial support from the Division of Research of the Harvard Business School. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic...
Journal of Economic Perspectives (forthcoming) (2008)
Markus K. Brunnermeier, Sylvain Champonnois, Ing-haw Cheng, Doug Diamond, Joel Hasbrouck, John Kambhu, ...
Financial markets experienced extraordinary events in 2007 and 2008. The increase in delin-quency rates of subprime mortgages, coupled with the mismatch in the maturity structures of...
Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer, Daniel Kahneman
1974, 1983, 2002) published a series of remarkable experiments documenting significant deviations from Bayesian theory of judgment under uncertainty. While KT’s heuristics and biases program has...
Comments welcome Do CEOs Matter?* (2008)
Morten Bennedsen, Francisco Pérez-gonzález, Daniel Wolfenzon, Luis Garicano, Maria Guadalupe, Felix Meschke, ...
Abstract. Estimating the value of top managerial talent is a central topic of research that has attracted widespread attention from academics and practitioners. Yet, testing for the importance of...
U.S. banks, crises, and bailouts: From Mexico to LTCM (2007)
Dong Lee, René M. Stulz, Andrei Shleifer, Tony S, Ralph Walkling, ...
participants at seminars at the IMF and the Ohio State University. U.S. banks, crises, and bailouts: From Mexico to LTCM
Investor Protection and Equity Markets 1 (2007)
Andrei Shleifer, Daniel Wolfenzon
We present a simple model of an entrepreneur going public in an environment with poor legal protection of outside shareholders. The model incorporates elements of Becker’s (1968) “crime and...
Technology, Information Production, and Market Efficiency (2007)
A well functioning securities market relies on the availability of accurate information, a broad base of investors who can process this information, legal protection of these investors ’ rights,...
Media Bias Sendhil Mullainathan and Andrei Shleifer* (MIT and Harvard University) (2007)
Simon Johnson, Larry Katz, Sendhil Mullainathan, Andrei Shleifer
There are two different types of media bias. One bias, which we refer to as ideology, reflects a news outlet's desire to affect reader opinions in a particular direction. The second bias, which...
and Poor's for providing data. (2007)
Nicholas Barberis, Andrei Shleifer, Jeffrey Wurgler, Kenneth French, Will Goetzmann, ...
A number of studies have identified patterns of positive correlation of returns, or comovement, among different traded securities. The traditional view of comovement explains these patterns with a...
Will the Sovereign Debt Market Survive? (2007)
Robert Inman, Anne Krueger, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-silanes, All Picker, Michael Rashes, ...
comments. Economic theory and evidence from a variety of debt markets shed light on current reform proposals concerning emerging market debt. Debt markets, including the U.S. municipal bond market,...
Abstract State versus Private Ownership (2007)
Private ownership should generally be preferred to public ownership when the incentives to innovate and to contain costs must be strong. In essence, this is the case for capitalism over socialism,...
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-silanes, Andrei Shleifer, To Constanza Blanco, Luis Leyva, ...
We examine the effect of securities laws on market development in 49 countries. We find that public enforcement of laws benefits securities markets, especially in countries with efficient government...
The New Comparative Economics 1 (2007)
Simeon Djankov, Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Olivier Blanchard, ...
In recent years, comparative economics experienced a revival, with a new focus on comparing capitalist economies. The theme of the new research is that institutions exert a profound influence on...
The Practice of Justice 1 (2007)
Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Louis Kaplow, Bert Kritzer, ...
In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for non-payment of rent and to collect a...
* Harvard University. We are grateful to Alexander Aganin, Carlos Berdejo-Izquierdo, David (2007)
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Bernardo Lopez-morton, Tatiana Nenova, Ekaterina Trizlova, ...
We present data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies, making an effort to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in...
∗We thank many people at State Street Corporation and State Street Associates for help in (2007)
Kenneth Froot, Kenneth A. Froot, Tarun Ramadorai, Tarun Ramadorai, John Campbell, ...
We explore the interaction between exchange rates, institutional in-vestor currency flows and exchange-rate fundamentals. We find that these flows are highly correlated with contemporaneous and...
Jonathan Isham, Daniel Kaufmann, Angus Deaton, Paul Duane, Eduardo Engel, Stanley Fischer, ...
Using economic rates of return from World Bank-funded investments, we investigate how country characteristics and policies that influence aggregate performance affect investment productivity....
Xin Chen provided extraordinary research assistance. We received helpful comments from (2007)
James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Ross Levine, Asli Demirguc-kunt, Simeon Djankov, Patrick Honohan, ...
the help of Iffath Sharif and Cindy Lee, as well as financial support from the World Bank.
J. Luis Guasch, Joseph Kogan, Tarun Khanna, Michael Kremer, Andrei Shleifer, ...
participants for helpful comments on this paper. We also thank Lis Suarez for assistance with data entry. Partial funding from PPIAF and Harvard University is gratefully acknowledged. The views in...
The new comparative economics: a first look. (2007)
Simeon Djankov, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-silanes, Florencio Lopez-de-silanes, ...
In recent years, comparative economics experienced a revival, with a new focus on comparing capitalist economies. The transition from socialism, the Asian financial crisis, and the European economic...
THE REGULATION OF ENTRY 1 (2007)
Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Andrei Shleifer
Abstract. We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data cover the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before...
Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a cross-section of firms* (2007)
Jakob Svensson T, Roberta Gatti, Dani Kaufinann, Aart Kraay, Stefan Palmqvist, Tomten Persson, ...
This paper exploits an unique data set on corruption containing information on estimated bribe payments of Ugandan firms. To guide the empirical analysis a simple rent-extortion model is developed....
Mike Burkart, Fausto Panunzi, Andrei Shleifer, Nota Di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni, ...
This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
Not for quotation Comments solicited (2007)
Eugene F. Fama, Eugene F. Fama, Kenneth R. French, Kenneth R. French, Andrei Shleifer, Tuomo Vuolteenaho, ...
We estimate the equity premium using dividend and earnings growth rates to measure the expected rate of capital gain. Our estimates for 1951-2000, 2.55 % and 4.32%, are much lower than the equity...
Investor protection and corporate valuation 1 (2007)
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny, Research Assistance, Malcolm Baker, ...
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a...
Todd Mitton, Sendhil Mullainathan, David Scharfstein, Jeremy Stein For, To Simeon Djankov, Kristin Forbes, ...
A cross-firm analysis of the impact of corporate governance on
Investor Protection and Equity Markets 1 (2007)
Andrei Shleifer, Daniel Wolfenzon
We present a simple model of an entrepreneur going public in an environment with poor legal protection of outside shareholders. The model incorporates elements of Becker’s (1968) “crime and...
To Abhijit Banerjee, Richard Ericson, Arye Hillman, Mark Levine, Victor Polterovitch, Andrei Shleifer, ...
We study emergence and interaction of red tape and corruption in a principal-bureaucrat-agent hierarchy. We assume that the red tape is informative: albeit imposing some cost upon the agent it also...
Federalism with and without political centralization. China versus Russia. (2007)
Simon Johnson, Jim Snyder, Olivier Blanchard, Olivier Blanchard, Andrei Shleifer, Andrei Shleifer
In China, local governments have actively contributed to the growth of new ¯rms. In Russia, local governments have typically stood in the way, be it through taxation, regulation, or corruption....
Finance, Investment and Growth (2007)
Wendy Carlin And, Wendy Carlin, Colin Mayer, John Cable, Jeremy Edwards, Günter Franke, ...
This paper examines the relation between the institutional structures of advanced OECD countries and the comparative growth and investment of 27 industries in those countries over the period 1970 to...
Sendhil Mullainathan MIT and NBER The Market for News (2007)
Andrei Shleifer, Edward Glaeser, Matthew Gentzkow, Simon Johnson, Emir Kamenica, Lawrence Katz, ...
We investigate the market for news under two assumptions: that readers hold beliefs that they like to see confirmed, and that newspapers can slant stories toward these beliefs. We show that, on the...
Juan Carlos, Botero Rafael, La Porta, Florencio Lpez-de-silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Alexander Volokh
A review of the evidence on judicial reform across countries shows that those seeking to improve economic performance should not focus on judicial efficiency alone but on independence as well. It...
J. Bradford Delong, Konstantin Magin, Christopher Delong, Jim Hines, Rajnish Mehra, Andrei Shleifer, ...
First, preliminary draft: not for citation or quotation without acknowledging its preliminary status.
Overruling and the Instability of Law (2006)
Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer, Ilia Rainer, Alan Schwartz, Kathryn Spier, Mathew Stephenson, ...
We investigate the evolution of common law under overruling, a system of precedent change in which appellate courts replace existing legal rules with new ones. We use a legal realist model, in which...
Family Firms, Paternalism, and Labor Relations ∗ (2006)
Lucian Bebchuk, Andrew Clark, Michael Faulkender, Radha Gopalan, Oliver Hart, Winfried Koeniger, ...
Using firm-, industry-, and country-level data, we document a link between family ownership and labor relations. Across countries, we find that family ownership is relatively more prevalent in...
What works in securities laws (2006)
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-silanes, Andrei Shleifer, To Constanza Blanco, Leyva Martinez, ...
We examine the effect of securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries. We find little evidence that public enforcement benefits stock markets, but strong evidence that laws mandating...
PAPER PREPARED FOR THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES (2006)
Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, Luigi Zingales, William Ocasio, Francisco Perez-gonzales, Bruce Sacerdote, ...
Until recently, economists have been reluctant to rely on culture as a possible determinant of economic phenomena. Much of this reluctance stems from the very notion of culture: it is so broad and...
Measuring and explaining management practices across firms and countries (2006)
Nick Bloom, John Van Reenen, George Baker, Eric Bartelsman, Oliver Hart, James Hines, ...
Centre for Economic Performance and the LSE We use an innovative survey tool to collect management practice data from 732 medium sized manufacturing firms in the US and Europe (France, Germany and...
The New Comparative Economics (2005)
Djankov, Simeon, Glaeser, Edward, La Porta, Rafael, Shleifer, Andrei
In recent years, the field of comparative economics refocused on the comparison of capitalist economies. The theme of the new research is that institutions exert a profound influence on economic...
The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing (2005)
November Th Simeon, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Melissa Johns
this paper do not reflect those of the World Bank or of Lex Mundi. Please do not quote without permission from the authors
CEO overconfidence and corporate investment (2005)
Ulrike Malmendier, Geoffrey Tate, Larry Katz, Tom Knox, David Laibson, Andrei Shleifer
We argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and view external funds as...
The Curley Effect: The Economics of Shaping the Electorate (2005)
Glaeser, Edward L., Shleifer, Andrei
James Michael Curley, a four-time mayor of Boston, used wasteful redistribution to his poor Irish constituents and incendiary rhetoric to encourage richer citizens to emigrate from Boston, thereby...
The Regulation of Labor (2004)
Botero, Juan, Djankov, Simeon, La Porta, Rafael, Shleifer, Andrei
We investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment, collective relations, and social security laws in 85 countries. We find that the political power of the left is associated with more...
Do Institutions Cause Growth? (2004)
Edward Glaeser Rafael, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-silanes, Andrei Shleifer
We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most...
Jens Hilscher, Yves Nosbusch, N. Gregory Mankiw, Gregory Connor, Darrell Duffie, Nicola Fuchs-schündeln, ...
and discussions. We also thank Timothy Callen and James Morsink at the IMF, Gonca Okur at the World Bank, Carmen Reinhart, and Alvin Ying at J.P. Morgan for providing us with data and Pavel...
Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents (2004)
Timothy Besley, Maitreesh Ghatak, Ben Bernanke, Michela Cella, Leonardo Felli, Julian Le Gr, ...
A unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private non-pro…ts is the importance of missions, as opposed to pro…t, as an organizational goal. Such...
Barberis, Nicholas, Shleifer, Andrei, Wurgler, Jeffrey
We consider two broad views of return comovement: the traditional view, derived from frictionless economies with rational investors, which attributes it to comovement in news about fundamental value,...
Barberis, Nicholas, Shleifer, Andrei, Wurgler, Jeffrey
We consider two broad views of return comovement: the traditional view, derived from frictionless economies with rational investors, which attributes it to comovement in news about fundamental value,...
Simeon Djankov, Caralee Mcliesh, Tatiana Nenova, Andrei Shleifer
We examine the patterns of media ownership in 97 countries around the world. We find that almost universally the largest media firms are owned by the government or by private families. Government...
The injustice of inequality (2003)
Edward Glaeser, Jose Scheinkman, Edward L. Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer, Andrei Shleifer
In many countries, the operation of legal, political and regulatory institutions is subverted by the wealthy and the politically powerful for their own benefit. This subversion takes the form of...
The Regulation of Labor (2003)
Juan Botero, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-silanes, Andrei Shleifer, I. Introduction
Every country in the world today has established a complex system of laws and institutions intended to protect the interests of workers and to guarantee a minimum standard of living to its...
The Regulation of Labor (2003)
Juan Botero, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Eidelman Gonzalez, ...
We investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment, collective relations, and social security laws in 85 countries. We find that the political power of the left is associated with more...
Capital Markets and Legal Development: the China Case (2003)
Zhiwu Chen, Belton Fleisher, Donald Clarke, Andrei Shleifer, Steve Yun For
Recent research establishes a significant positive correlation between law and finance (and hence economic growth), re-starting a debate on the “law matters ” thesis. However, which way the...
Sendhil Mullainathan MIT and NBER The Market for News (2003)
Andrei Shleifer, Edward Glaeser, Matthew Gentzkow, Simon Johnson, Emir Kamenica, Lawrence Katz, ...
We investigate the market for news under two assumptions: that readers hold beliefs that they like to see confirmed, and that newspapers can slant stories toward these beliefs. We show that, on the...
The Regulation of Labor (2003)
Juan C. Botero, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Eugenio De Bellard, ...
We investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment, collective relations, and social security laws in 85 countries. We find that the political power of the left is associated with more...
Simeon Djankov, Caralee Mcliesh, Tatiana Nenova, Andrei Shleifer
We examine the patterns of media ownership in 97 countries around the world. We find that almost universally the largest media firms are owned by the government or by private families. Government...
Bank regulation and supervision: what works best (2003)
James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Ross Levine, Jel Classification, Asli Demirgüç-kunt, Simeon Djankov, ...
the help of Iffath Sharif and Cindy Lee, as well as financial support from the World Bank. Xin Chen provided extraordinary research assistance. We received helpful comments from
Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-silanes, Guillermo Zamarripa, David Scharfstein, Andrei Shleifer, Jeremy Stein, ...
In many countries, banks lend to related parties, e.g., to firms controlled by the bank’s owners. We examine the benefits of related lending using a newly assembled dataset for Mexico. We find that...
Bank regulation and supervision: what works best (2003)
James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Ross Levine, Jel Classification, Asli Demirgüç-kunt, Simeon Djankov, ...
the help of Iffath Sharif and Cindy Lee, as well as financial support from the World Bank. Xin Chen provided extraordinary research assistance. We received helpful comments from
The Regulation of Labor (2003)
Juan Botero, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Eidelman Gonzalez, ...
We investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment, collective relations, and social security laws in 85 countries. We find that the political power of the left is associated with more...
Does Investor Misvaluation Drive the Takeover Market? (2003)
Ming Dong, David Hirshleifer, Scott Richardson, Siew Hong Teoh, Peter Easton, ...
This paper tests the hypothesis that irrational market misvaluation a#ects firms' takeover behavior. We employ two contemporaneous proxies for market misvaluation, pre-takeover book/price ratios...
provided that full credit including © notice, is given to the source. The Regulation of Labor (2003)
Juan Botero, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-silanes, Andrei Shliefer, Andrei Shleifer, ...
tables can be found at
Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? (2003)
Sara B. Moeller, Frederik P. Schlingemann, René M. Stulz, Jel G, Jean Helwege, ...
Acquiring-firm shareholders lost 12 cents at the announcement of acquisitions for every dollar spent on acquisitions for a total loss of $240 billion from 1998 through 2001, whereas they lost $7...
Botero, Juan Carlos, La Porta, Rafael, Shleifer, Andrei, Volokh, Alexander
A review of the evidence on judicial reform across countries shows that those seeking to improve economic performance should not focus on judicial efficiency alone but on independence as well. It...
Shleifer, Andrei, Panunzi, Fausto, Burkart, Mike
We present a model of succession in a firm controlled and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on how much,...
Edward L. Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer
A central requirement in the design of a legal system is the protection of law enforcers from coercion by litigants through either violence or bribes. The higher the risk of coercion, the greater the...
Investor protection and corporate valuation (2002)
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a...
Edward L. Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer
James Michael Curley, a four-time mayor of Boston, used wasteful redistribution to his poor Irish constituents and incendiary rhetoric to encourage richer citizens to emigrate from Boston, thereby...
Industry Growth and Capital Allocation: Does Having a Market- or Bank-Based System Matter (2002)
Thorsten Beck, Ross Levine, Jel Classification, Nicola Cetorelli, Robert Cull, Patrick Honohan, ...
Abstract: Are market-based or bank-based financial systems better at financing the expansion of industries that depend heavily on external finance, facilitating the formation of new establishments,...
Edward L. Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer, Rafael La Porta, Steve Levitt, Eric Posner, Sherwin Rosen, ...
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The laws of many countries in the world originate in those of England and France. Legal systems based on the laws of England are typically described...
The Regulation of Entry (2002)
Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Andrei Shleifer, Richard Caves, Jacqueline Coolidge, ...
Abstract. We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 75 countries. The data set contains information on the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a...
Barberis, Nicholas, Shleifer, Andrei, Wurgler, Je Rey
A number of studies have identified patterns of positive correlation of returns, or comovement, among different traded securities. We distinguish three views of such comovement. The traditional...
Barberis, Nicholas, Shleifer, Andrei, Wurgler, Jeffrey
A number of studies have identified patterns of positive correlation of returns, or comovement, among different traded securities. We distinguish three views of such co- movement. The traditional...
Barberis, Nicholas, Shleifer, Andrei, Wurgler, Je Rey
A number of studies have identified patterns of positive correlation of returns, or comovement, among different traded securities. We distinguish three views of such comovement. The traditional...
Barberis, Nicholas, Shleifer, Andrei, Wurgler, Jeffrey
A number of studies have identified patterns of positive correlation of returns, or comovement, among different traded securities. We distinguish three views of such co- movement. The traditional...
Investor Protection and Equity Markets (2001)
Shleifer, Andrei, Wolfenzon, Daniel
We present a simple model of an entrepreneur going public in an environment with poor legal protection of outside shareholders. The model incorporates elements of Becker’s (1968) “crime and...
Investor Protection and Equity Markets (2001)
We present a simple model of an entrepreneur going public in an environment with poor legal protection of outside shareholders. The model incorporates elements of Becker’s (1968) “crime and...
Investor Protection and Equity Markets (2001)
Shleifer, Andrei, Wolfenzon, Daniel
We present a simple model of an entrepreneur going public in an environment with poor legal protection of outside shareholders. The model incorporates elements of Becker’s (1968) “crime and...
Investor Protection and Equity Markets (2001)
We present a simple model of an entrepreneur going public in an environment with poor legal protection of outside shareholders. The model incorporates elements of Becker’s (1968) “crime and...
Coase versus the coasians (2001)
Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson, Andrei Shleifer, Simeon Djankov, Oliver Hart, ...
Who should enforce laws or contracts: judges or regulators? Many Coasians, though not Coase himself, advocate judicial enforcement. We show that the incentives facing judges and regulators crucially...
Not-for-profit entrepreneurs (2001)
Edward L. Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer
Entrepreneurs who start new firms may choose not-for-profit status as a means of committing to soft incentives. Such incentives protect donors, volunteers, consumers and employees from ex post...
given to the source. The Rise of the Regulatory State (2001)
Edward L. Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer, Edward L. Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer, Edward L. Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer
During the Progressive Era at the beginning of the 20 th century, the United States replaced litigation by regulation as the principal mechanism of social control of business. To explain why this...
Government Ownership of Banks (2000)
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-silanes, Andrei Shleifer
We assemble data on government ownership of banks around the world. The data show that such ownership is large and pervasive, and higher in countries with low levels of per capita income, backward...
Do CEOs Set Their Own Pay? The Ones Without Principals Do (2000)
Marianne Bertrand, Sendhil Mullainathan, Rajesh Aggarwal, George Baker, Patrick Bolton, ...
We empirically examine two competing views of CEO pay. In the contracting view, payis used to solve an agency problem: the compensation committee optimally chooses pay contracts which give the CEO...
Disappearing Dividends: Changing Firm Characteristics or Lower Propensity to Pay? (1999)
Eugene F. Fama, Eugene F. Fama, Kenneth R. French, Kenneth R. French, Andrei Shleifer, Paul Zarowin, ...
The percent of firms paying cash dividends falls from 66.5 in 1978 to 20.8 in 1999. The decline is due in part to the changing characteristics of publicly traded firms. Fed by new lists, the...
Accounting for Growth in Post-Soviet Russia (1999)
Daniel Berkowitz, David N. DeJong, Acknowledgments We, Anders Aslund, Gleb Bylov, Lev Freinkman, ...
In pursuit of its transition from a command to a market economy, post-Soviet Russia has witnessed enormous regional differences in economic growth rates. Moreover, the economic reforms implemented...
Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment (1998)
Brad M. Barber, Terrance Odean, David Hirshleifer, Andrew Karolyi, Tim Loughran, Edward Opton, ...
Theoretical models predict that overconfident investors trade excessively. We test this prediction by partitioning investors on gender. Psychological research demonstrates that, in areas such as...
Politics and Entrepreneurship in Transition Economies (1997)
Johnson, Simon, Kaufmann, Daniel, Shleifer, Andrei
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39447/3/wp57.pdf
Matthew B. Ellman, Oliver Hart, Eric Maskin, Andrei Shleifer, Matthew B. Ellman
Design, ” BEC2000-1026, Xavier Calsamiglia (Project head)
ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION (1994)
HIRSHLEIFER, JACK, JENSEN, MICHAEL C., HALL, ROBERT E., SHLEIFER, ANDREI, MECKLING, WILLIAM H.
The business cycle and the stock market /--by Andrei Shleifer. (1986)
Supervised by Peter A. Diamond and Franklin M. Fisher.
Large shareholders and corporate control (1986)
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use...
Informational aspects of securities markets /--by Robert Ward Vishny. (1985)
Vishny, Robert Ward., Shleifer, Andrei.
Supervised by Franklin M. Fisher and Eric S. Maskin.
La Porta, Rafael, Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert
We investigate empirically the determinants of the quality of governments in a large cross-section of countries. We assess government performance using measures of government intervention, public...
Casey B. Mulligan, Andrei Shleifer
We present a model of efficient regulation along the lines of Demsetz (1967). In this model, setting up and running regulatory institutions takes a fixed cost, and therefore jurisdictions with larger...
We present a model of the creation of social networks, such as political parties, trade unions, religious coalitions, or political action committees, through discussion and mutual persuasion among...
Does Competition Destroy Ethical Behavior?
Explanations of unethical behavior often neglect the role of competition, as opposed to greed, in assuring its spread. Using the examples of child labor, corruption, excessive' executive pay,...
Djankov, Simeon, McLeish, Caralee, Nenova, Tatiana, Shleifer, Andrei
The authors examine patterns of media ownership in 97 countries around the world. They find that almost universally the largest media firms are controlled by the government or by private families....
Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer
We evaluate Richard Posner's famous hypothesis that common law converges to efficient legal rules using a model of precedent setting by appellate judges. Following legal realists, we assume that...
Legal Determinants of External Finance.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
Using a sample of forty-nine countries, the authors show that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have...
Glaeser, Edward L, Hedi D. Kallal, Jose A. Scheinkman, Andrei Shleifer
Recent theories of economic growth, including those of P. Romer (1986, 1990), M. Porter (1990), and J. Jacobs (1969, 1984), have stressed the role of technological spillovers in generating growth....
How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops.
Barberis, Nicholas, Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer, Natalia Tsukanova
The authors use a survey of 452 Russian shops, most of which were privatized between 1992 and 1993, to measure the importance of alternative channels through which privatization promotes...
Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets.
De Long, J Bradford, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers, Robert J. Waldmann
The authors present a simple overlapping generations model of an asset market in which irrational noise traders with erroneous stochastic beliefs both affect prices and earn higher expected returns....
Djankov, Simeon, Glaeser, Edward, La Porta, Rafael, Lopez De Silanes, Florencio, Shleifer, Andrei
In recent years, comparative economics experienced a revival, with a new focus on comparing capitalist economies. The theme of the new research is that institutions exert a profound influence on...
Private Credit in 129 Countries
Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh, Andrei Shleifer
We investigate cross-country determinants of private credit, using new data on legal creditor rights and private and public credit registries in 129 countries. We find that both creditor protection...
The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing
Simeon Djankov, Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
We present a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. Assembled with the help of Lex Mundi law firms, the...
A Case for Quantity Regulation
Edward L. Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer
Contrary to the standard economic advice, many regulations of financial intermediaries, as well as other regulations such as blue laws, fishing rules, zoning restrictions, or pollution controls, take...
Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh, Tatiana Nenova, Andrei Shleifer
We examine the patterns of media ownership in 97 countries around the world. We find that almost universally the largest media firms are owned by the government or by private families. Government...
Edward L. Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer
A central requirement in the design of a legal system is the protection of law enforcers from coercion by litigants through either violence or bribes. The higher the risk of coercion, the greater the...
Technology, Information Production, and Market Efficiency
Gene D'Avolio, Efi Gildor, Andrei Shleifer
A well functioning securities market relies on the availability of accurate information, a broad base of investors who can process this information, legal protection of these investors’ rights, and...
The Rise of the Regulatory State
Edward L. Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer
During the Progressive Era at the beginning of the 20 th century, the United States replaced litigation by regulation as the principal mechanism of social control of business. To explain why this...
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Cristian Pop-Eleches, Andrei Shleifer
Hayek (1960) distinguishes the institutions of English freedom, which guarantee the independence of judges from political interference in the administration of justice, from those of American...
Mike Burkart, Fausto Panunzi, Andrei Shleifer
We present a model of succession in a firm controlled and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on how much,...
Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for non-payment of rent and to collect a...
Nicholas Barberis, Andrei Shleifer, Jeffrey Wurgler
A number of studies have identifed patterns of positive correlation of returns, or comovement, among different traded securities. We distinguish three views of such comovement. The traditional...
Edward L. Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer
James Michael Curley, a four-time mayor of Boston, used wasteful redistribution to his poor Irish constituents and incendiary rhetoric to encourage richer citizens to emigrate from Boston, thereby...
Edward L. Glaeser, Jose Scheinkman, Andrei Shleifer
In many countries, the operation of legal, political and regulatory institutions is subverted by the wealthy and the politically powerful for their own benefit. This subversion takes the form of...
Sendhil Mullainathan, Andrei Shleifer
There are two different types of media bias. One bias, which we refer to as ideology, reflects a news outlet's desire to affect reader opinions in a particular direction. The second bias, which we...
Will The Sovereign Debt Market Survive?
Economic theory and evidence from a variety of debt markets shed light on current reform proposals concerning emerging market debt. Debt markets, including the U. S. municipal bond market, generally...
Simeon Djankov, Edward L. Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
In recent years, comparative economics experienced a revival, with a new focus on comparing capitalist economies. The theme of the new research is that institutions exert a profound influence on...
Andrei Shleifer, Daniel Treisman
During the 1990s, Russia underwent an extraordinary transformation from a communist dictatorship to a multi-party democracy, from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, and from a...
Bequests as a Means of Payment
B. Douglas Bernheim, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers
Although recent research suggests that intergenerational transfers play an important role in aggregate capital accumulation, our understanding of bequest motives remains incomplete. We develop a...
Management Ownership and Corporate Performance: An Empirical Analysis
Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
We investigate the relation between management ownership and corporate performance, as measured by Tobin's Q. In a cross-section of Fortune 500 firms, Tobin's Q first increases and then declines as...
The Economic Consequences of Noise Traders
Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers, Robert J. Waldmann
The claim that financial markets are efficient is backed by an implicit argument that misinformed "noise traders" can have little influence on asset prices in equilibrium. If noise traders' beliefs...
Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation
Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers, Robert J. Waldmann
Analyses of the role of rational speculators in financial markets usually presume that such investors dampen price fluctuations by trading against liquidity or noise traders. This conclusion does not...
The Size and Incidence of the Losses from Noise Trading
Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers, Robert J. Waldmann
Recent empirical research has identified a significant amount of volatility in stock prices that cannot be easily explained by changes in fundamentals; one interpretation is that asset prices respond...
Princes and Merchants: European City Growth before the Industrial Revolution
As measured by the pace of city growth in western Europe from 1000 to 1800. absolutist monarchs stunted the growth of commerce and industry. A region ruled by an absolutist prince saw its total urban...
Overruling and the Instability of Law
Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer
We investigate the evolution of common law under overruling, a system of precedent change in which appellate courts replace existing legal rules with new ones. We use a legal realist model, in which...
Industrialization and the Big Push
Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
This paper explores Rosenstein-Rodman's (1943) idea that simultaneous industrialization of many sectors of the economy can be profitable for all of them, even when no sector can break even...
The Efficiency of Investment in the Presence of Aggregate Demand Spillovers
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
In the presence of aggregate demand spillovers, an imperfectly competitive firm's profit is positively related to aggregate income, which in turn rises with profits of all firms in the economy. This...
Characteristics of Hostile and Friendly Takeover Targets
Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
Compared to an average Fortune 500 firm, a target of a hostile takeover is smaller, older, has a lower Tobin's Q, invests less of its income, and is growing more slowly. The low Q seems to be an...
Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer
We present a model of lawmaking by appellate courts in which judges influenced by policy preferences can distinguish precedents at some cost. We find a cost and a benefit of diversity of judicial...
Why does democracy need education?
Edward Glaeser, Giacomo Ponzetto, Andrei Shleifer
Across countries, education and democracy are highly correlated. We motivate empirically and then model a causal mechanism explaining this correlation. In our model, schooling teaches people to...
Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer
Does it matter for the outcome of a trial who the judge is? Legal practitioners typically believe that the answer is yes, yet legal scholarship sees trial judges as predictably enforcing established...
The Stock Market and Investment: Is the Market a Sideshow?
Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
macroeconomics, stock market
Reversing the Soviet Economic Collapse
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
macroeconomics, Soviet, economic collapse
MAXIM BOYCKO, ANDREI SHLEIFER, ROBERT W. VISHNY
macroeconomics, Russia, privatizing, privatization
The Unofficial Economy in Transition
Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufman, Andrei Shleifer
macroeconomics, official economy
Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle.
Lee, Charles M C, Shleifer, Andrei, Thaler, Richard H
This paper examines the proposition that fluctuations in discounts of closed-end funds are driven by changes in individual investor sentiment. The theory implies that discounts on various funds move...
Journal of Economic Perspectives
Papers published in the Journal of Economic Perspectives
State versus Private Ownership.
Private ownership should generally be preferred to public ownership when the incentives to innovate and to contain costs must be strong. In essence, this is the case for capitalism over socialism,...
Djankov, Simeon, La Porta, Rafael, Shleifer, Andrei, Lopez De Silanes, Florencio
The authors present new data on the regulation of the entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data cover the number if procedures, official time, and official costs that a start-up firm must...
Boycko, Maxim, Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W
Public enterprises around the world have proved to be highly inefficient, primarily because they pursue strategies, such as excess employment, that satisfy the political objectives of politicians who...
Corporate Ownership Around the World
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
We use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good...
Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the "outcome model," dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to disgorge cash....
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
We assemble data on government ownership of banks around the world. The data show that such ownership is large and pervasive, and higher in countries with low levels of per capita income, backward...
Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a...
Mike Burkart, Fausto Panunzi, Andrei Shleifer
We present a model of succession in a firm owned and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on what fraction...
What Works in Securities Laws?
RAFAEL PORTA, FLORENCIO LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, ANDREI SHLEIFER
We examine the effect of securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries. We find little evidence that public enforcement benefits stock markets, but strong evidence that laws mandating...
Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?
Morck, Randall, Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W
In a sample of 326 U.S. acquisitions between 1975 and 1987, three types of acquisitions have systematically lower and predominantly negative announcement period returns to bidding firms. The returns...
Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach.
Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W
The authors explore the determinants of liquidation values of assets, particularly focusing on the potential buyers of assets. When a firm in financial distress needs to sell assets, its industry...
Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and Risk.
Lakonishok, Josef, Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W
For many years, scholars and investment professionals have argued that value strategies outperform the market. These value strategies call for buying stocks that have low prices relative to earnings,...
Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W
Textbook arbitrage in financial markets requires no capital and entails no risk. In reality, almost all arbitrage requires capital and is typically risky. Moreover, professional arbitrage is...
A Survey of Corporate Governance.
Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W
This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around...
The Stock Market and Investment: Is the Market a Sideshow?
Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
macroeconomics, stock market
Reversing the Soviet Economic Collapse
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
macroeconomics, Soviet, economic collapse
The Unofficial Economy in Transition
Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufman, Andrei Shleifer
macroeconomics, official economy
MAXIM BOYCKO, ANDREI SHLEIFER, ROBERT W. VISHNY
macroeconomics, Russia, privatizing, privatization
Federalism With and Without Political Centralization: China Versus Russia
Olivier Blanchard, Andrei Shleifer
In China, local governments have actively contributed to the growth of new firms. In Russia, local governments have typically stood in the way, be it through taxation, regulation, or corruption. We...
MAXIM BOYCKO, ANDREI SHLEIFER, ROBERT W. VISHNY
macroeconomics, Russia, privatizing, privatization
Sendhil Mullainathan, Andrei Shleifer
We investigate the market for news under two assumptions: that readers hold beliefs which they like to see confirmed, and that newspapers can slant stories toward these beliefs. We show that, on the...
The Rise of the Regulatory State
Edward L. Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer
The Progressive Era of the early twentieth-century U.S. saw significant growth of government regulation of business. We model the choice of law enforcement strategy between private litigation over...
A Normal Country: Russia after Communism
Andrei Shleifer, Daniel Treisman
During the 1990s, Russia underwent an extraordinary transformation from a communist dictatorship to a multi-party democracy, from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, and from a...
The Politics of Market Socialism.
Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W
The debate over market socialism has ignored the importance of the assumptions about the objectives of politicians in determining resource allocation. Theory and evidence suggest that totalitarian...
Burkart, Mike, Panunzi, Fausto, Shleifer, Andrei
We present a model of succession in a firm controlled and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on how much,...
Edward L. Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most...
Technology, information production, and market efficiency
Gene D'Avolio, Efi Gildor, Andrei Shleifer
Technology ; Securities
Privatization in the United States
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny
In the United States, the two principal modes of producing local government services are in-house provision by government employees and contracting out to private suppliers, also known as...
Pervasive Shortages under Socialism
Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny
We present a new theory of pervasive shortages under socialism, based on the assumption that the planners are self-interested. Because the planners -- meaning bureaucrats in the ministries and...
Reversions of Excess Pension Assets after Takeovers
Jeffrey Pontiff, Andrei Shleifer, Michael S. Weisbach
This article evaluates pension asset reversions as a source of takeover gains. In our sample of 413 takeovers, pension funds were reverted by 15.1% of acquirers in the two years following hostile...
Greenmail, White Knights, and Shareholders' Interest
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
This article develops a model in which greenmail and other forms of management resistance to takeovers can benefit shareholders. In particular, discouraging some potential acquirers may increase...
A Theory of Yardstick Competition
In the typical regulatory scheme a franchised monopoly has little incentive to reduce costs. This article proposes a mechanism in which the price the regulated firm receives depends on the costs of...
Andrei Shleifer, Fausto Panunzi, Mike Burkart
We present a model of succession in a firm controlled and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on how much,...
Djankov, Simeon, La Porta, Rafael, Shleifer, Andrei
We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data covers the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can...
Djankov, Simeon, La Porta, Rafael, Shleifer, Andrei
In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for non-payment of rent and to collect a...
Djankov, Simeon, Glaeser, Edward L, Shleifer, Andrei
In recent years, comparative economics experienced a revival, with a new focus on comparing capitalist economies. The theme of the new research is that institutions exert a profound influence on...
Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent and to collect a...
Edward L. Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer
A central requirement in the design of a legal system is the protection of law enforcers from coercion by litigants through either violence or bribes. The higher the risk of coercion, the greater the...
Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data cover the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can...
Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson, Andrei Shleifer
Who should enforce laws or contracts: judges or regulators? Many Coasians, though not Coase himself, advocate judicial enforcement. We show that the incentives facing judges and regulators crucially...
The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons.
Hart, Oliver, Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W
When should a government provide a service in-house and when should it contract out provision? The authors develop a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of service or...
The Extent of the Market and the Supply of Regulation
Casey B. Mulligan, Andrei Shleifer
We present a model in which setting up and running a regulatory institution takes a fixed cost. As a consequence, the supply of regulation is limited by the extent of the market. We test three...
Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W
The authors present a model of bargaining between politicians and managers that explains many stylized facts about the behavior of state firms, their commercialization, and privatization. Subsidies...
Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W
This paper presents two propositions about corruption. First, the structure of government institutions and of the political process are very important determinants of the level of corruption. In...
The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth.
Murphy, Kevin M, Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W
A country's most talented people typically organize production by others, so they can spread their ability advantage over a larger scale. When the start firms, they innovate and foster growth, but...
Income Distribution, Market Size, and Industrialization.
Murphy, Kevin M, Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W
When world trade is costly, a country can profitably industrialize only if its domestic markets are large enough. In such a country, for increasing returns technologies to break even, sales must be...
Federalism With and Without Political Centralization: China Versus Russia
Olivier Blanchard, Andrei Shleifer
In China, local governments have actively contributed to the growth of new firms. In Russia, local governments have typically stood in the way, be it through taxation, regulation, or corruption. We...
Juan Carlos Botero, Rafael La Porta, Florencio LÛpez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Alexander Volokh
A review of the evidence on judicial reform across countries shows that those seeking to improve economic performance should not focus on judicial efficiency alone but on independence as well. It...
Andrei Shleifer, Rafael La Porta, Cristian Pop-Eleches
Hayek (1960) distinguishes the institutions of English freedom, which guarantee the independence of judges from political interference in the administration of justice, from those of American...
Andrei Shleifer, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta
In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for non-payment of rent and to collect a...
Andrei Shleifer, Simeon Djankov, Edward L. Glaeser, Rafael La Porta
In recent years, the field of comparative economics refocused on the comparison of capitalist economies. The theme of the new research is that institutions exert a profound influence on economic...
La Porta, Rafael, Shleifer, Andrei
In this paper we investigate a neglected aspect of financial systems of many countries around the world: government ownership of banks. We assemble data which establish four findings. First,...
Djankov, Simeon, La Porta, Rafael, Shleifer, Andrei
Countries differ significantly in the way they regulate the entry of new businesses. In this paper, we describe the required procedures governing entry regulation, as well as the time and the cost of...
The law and economics of self-dealing
Djankov, Simeon, La Porta, Rafael, Shleifer, Andrei
We present a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. Assembled with the help of Lex Mundi law firms, the...
Coarse Thinking and Persuasion
Sendhil Mullainathan, Joshua Schwartzstein, Andrei Shleifer
We present a model of uninformative persuasion in which individuals "think coarsely": they group situations into categories and apply the same model of inference to all situations within a category....
The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
In the last decade, economists have produced a considerable body of research suggesting that the historical origin of a country's laws is highly correlated with a broad range of its legal rules and...
COASE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA
SIMON JOHNSON, ANDREI SHLEIFER
There remains strong support in law and economics for three important Coasian positions: law does not matter; law matters but their institutions adapt to allow efficient private contracts; and...
Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control
Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
We examine performance and management characteristics of Fortune 500 firms experiencing one of three types of control change: internally precipitated management turnover, hostile takeover, and...
Costs Of Financial Distress, Delayed Calls Of Convertible Bonds, And The Role Of Investment Banks
Dwight Jaffee, Andrei Shleifer
In a frictionless market with perfect information, a shareholder-wealth- maximizing firm should force conversion of its convertible bond issue into stock as soon as the bond comes in-the-money. Firms...
Income Distribution, Market Size, and Industrialization
Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny
When world trade is not free and costless, a less developed country can profitably industrialize only if its domestic markets are large enough. In such a country, for increasing returns technologies...
The Survival of Noise Traders in Financial Markets
Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers, Robert J. Waldmann
We use the revised estimates of U.S. GNP constructed by Christina Romer (1989) to assess the time-series properties of U.S. output per capita over the past century. We reject at conventional...
Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers
Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers
The paper questions the common view that share price increases of firms involved in hostile takeovers measure efficiency gains from acquisitions. Even if such gains exist, most of the increase in the...
Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?
Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
This paper documents for a sample of 327 US acquisitions between 1975 and 1987 three forces that systematically reduce the announcement day return of bidding firms. The returns to bidding...
Building Blocks of Market Clearing Business Cycle Models
Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
We compare "real business cycle" and increasing returns models of economic fluctuations. In these models, business cycles are driven by productivity changes resulting either from technology shocks or...
Increasing Returns, Durables and Economic Fluctuations
Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
We describe an economy where a durable good is produced with an increasing returns to scale technology. Equilibria in this economy take the form of business cycles in which consumption fluctuates too...
Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle
Charles Lee, Andrei Shleifer, Richard Thaler
This paper examines the proposition that fluctuations in discounts on closed end funds are driven by changes in individual investor sentiment toward closed end funds and other securities. The theory...
The Bubble of 1929: Evidence from Closed-End Funds
Closed-end mutual funds provide one of the few cases in which economists can observe "fundamental" values directly, and compare them to market values: the fundamental value of a closed-end fund is...
The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth
Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
A country's most talented people typically organize production by others, so they can spread their ability advantage over a larger scale. When they start firms, they innovate and foster growth, but...
Window Dressing by Pension Fund Managers
Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer, Richard Thaler, Robert Vishny
This paper takes a first look at investment strategies of managers of 769 pension funds, with total assets of $129 billion at the end of 1989. The data show that managers of these funds tend to...
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
In this paper, we explore the link between asset sales end debt capacity. Asset sales are a common way far firms to raise cash, and so present an alternative to security issues for firms near...
Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer
We present a model of trade in which similar countries trade more with each other than very different countries. The reason is that high human capital countries have a comparative advantage at...
Edward L. Glaeser, Hedi D. Kallal, Jose A. Scheinkman, Andrei Shleifer
Recent theories of economic growth, including Romer (1986), Porter (1989) and Jacobs (1969), have stressed the role of technological spillovers in generating growth. Because such knowledge spillovers...
Pervasive Shortages Under Socialism
Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny
We present a new theory of pervasive shortages under socialism, based on the assumption that the planners are self-interested. Because the planners -- meaning bureaucrats in the ministries and...
Do Institutional Investors Destabilize Stock Prices? Evidence on Herding and Feedback Trading
Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
This paper uses a new data set of quarterly portfolio holdings of 769 all-equity pension funds between 1985 and 1989 to evaluate the potential effect of their trading on stock prices. We address two...
Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and Risk
Josef Lakonishok, Robert W. Vishny, Andrei Shleifer
For many years, stock market analysts have argued that value strategies outperform the market. These value strategies call for buying stocks that have low prices relative to earnings, dividends, book...
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
This paper presents two propositions about corruption. First, the structure of government institutions and the political process are a very important determinant of the level of corruption. In...
Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Cities
Edward L. Glaeser, Jose A. Scheinkman, Andrei Shleifer
We examine the relationship between urban characteristics in 1960 and urban growth (income and population) between 1960 and 1990. Our major findings are that income and population growth move...
Privatization in the United States
Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
In the United States, the two principal modes of producing local government services are inhouse provision by government employees and contracting out to private suppliers, also known as...
How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops
Nicholas Barberis, Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer, Natalia Tsukanova
We use a survey of 452 Russian shops, most of which were privatized between 1992 and 1993, to measure the importance of alternative channels through which privatization promotes restructuring....
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
In traditional models, arbitrage in a given security is performed by a large number of diversified investors taking small positions against its mispricing. In reality, however, arbitrage is conducted...
Good News for Value Stocks: Further Evidence on Market Efficiency
Rafael La Porta, Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny
This paper examines the hypothesis that the superior return to so-called value stocks is the result of expectational errors made by investors. We study stock price reactions around earnings...
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
This paper surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around...
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that...
The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons
Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
When should a government provide a service inhouse and when should it contract out provision? We develop a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of service or reducing cost....
The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand
Evidence from a survey of 105 shop-owners in Moscow and Warsaw shows that the reliance on private protection, as well as the burden of regulation and corruption, are much greater in Moscow. The...
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
Several authors suggest that trust is an important determinant of cooperation between strangers in a society, and therefore of performance of social institutions. We argue that trust should be...
Legal Determinants of External Finance
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
Using a sample of 49 countries, we show that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower...
Nicholas Barberis, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
Recent empirical research in finance has uncovered two families of pervasive regularities: underreaction of stock prices to news such as earnings announcements; and overreaction of stock prices to a...
Corporate Ownership Around the World
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, Andrei Shleifer
We present data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies, making an effort to identify ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies...
Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny
This paper addresses the question of why firms pay dividends, the so-called outline two agency models of dividends. On what we call outcome minority shareholders to force corporate outsiders to...
State Versus Private Ownership
Private ownership should generally be preferred to public ownership when the incentives to innovate and to contain costs must be strong. In essence, this is the case for capitalism over socialism,...
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny
We investigate empirically the determinants of the quality of governments in a large cross-section of countries. We assess government performance using measures of government intervention, public...
Edward L. Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer
Entrepreneurs who start new firms may choose not-for-profit status as a means of committing to soft incentives. Such incentives protect donors, volunteers, consumers and employees from ex post...
Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a...
Investor Protection: Origins, Consequences, and Reform
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
Recent research has documented large differences between countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend policies, and in the...
Simon Johnson, Andrei Shleifer
The Coase theorem implies that, in a world of positive transaction costs, any of a number of strategies, including judicially enforced private contracts, judicially enforced laws, or even government...
Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio LopezdeSilanes, Andrei Shleifer
Tunnelling is defined as the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of their controlling shareholders. We describe the various forms that tunnelling can take, and examine under...
Federalism with and without Political Centralization: China versus Russia
Olivier Blanchard, Andrei Shleifer
In China, local governments have actively contributed to the growth of new firms. In Russia, local governments have typically stood in the way, be it through taxation, regulation, or corruption....
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopezde-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
In this paper, we investigate a neglected aspect of financial systems of many countries around the world: government ownership of banks. We assemble data which establish four findings. First,...
Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio LopezdeSilanes, Andrei Shleifer
We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 75 countries. The data set contains information on the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must...
Investor Protection and Equity Markets
Andrei Shleifer, Daniel Wolfenson
We present a simple model of an entrepreneur going public in an environment with poor legal protection of outside shareholders. The model incorporates elements of Becker's (1968) crime and...
Nicholas Barberis, Andrei Shleifer
We study asset prices in an economy where some investors classify risky assets into different styles and move funds back and forth between these styles depending on their relative performance. Our...
A Case for Quantity Regulation
Edward L. Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer
Contrary to the standard economic advice, many regulations of financial intermediaries, as well as other regulations such as blue laws, fishing rules, zoning restrictions, or pollution controls, take...
Edward L. Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer
A central requirement in the design of a legal system is the protection of law enforcers from coercion by litigants through either violence or bribes. The higher the risk of coercion, the greater the...
Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh, Tatiana Nenova, Andrei Shleifer
We examine the patterns of media ownership in 97 countries around the world. We find that almost universally the largest media firms are owned by the government or by private families. Government...
Stock Market Driven Acquisitions
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
We present a model of mergers and acquisitions based on stock market misvaluations of the combining firms. The key ingredients of the model are the relative valuations of the merging firms, the...
The Rise of the Regulatory State
Edward L. Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer
During the Progressive Era at the beginning of the 20th century, the United States replaced litigation by regulation as the principal mechanism of social control of business. To explain why this...
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, Cristian Pop-Eleches, Andrei Shleifer
Hayek (1960) distinguishes the institutions of English freedom, which guarantee the independence of judges from political interference in the administration of justice, from those of American...
Mike Burkart, Fausto Panunzi, Andrei Shleifer
We present a model of succession in a firm controlled and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on how much,...
Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, Andrei Shleifer
In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for non-payment of rent and to collect a...
Nicholas Barberis, Andrei Shleifer, Jeffrey Wurgler
A number of studies have identifed patterns of positive correlation of returns, or comovement, among different traded securities. We distinguish three views of such comovement. The traditional...
Edward L. Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer
James Michael Curley, a four-time mayor of Boston, used wasteful redistribution to his poor Irish constituents and incendiary rhetoric to encourage richer citizens to emigrate from Boston, thereby...
Edward L. Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer
In many countries, the operation of legal, political and regulatory institutions is subverted by the wealthy and the politically powerful for their own benefit. This subversion takes the form of...
Sendhil Mullainathan, Andrei Shleifer
There are two different types of media bias. One bias, which we refer to as ideology, reflects a news outlet's desire to affect reader opinions in a particular direction. The second bias, which we...
Will the Sovereign Debt Market Survive?
Economic theory and evidence from a variety of debt markets shed light on current reform proposals concerning emerging market debt. Debt markets, including the U.S. municipal bond market, generally...
Simeon Djankov, Edward L. Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, Andrei Shleifer
In recent years, comparative economics experienced a revival, with a new focus on comparing capitalist economies. The theme of the new research is that institutions exert a profound influence on...
Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, Andrei Shleifer, Juan Botero
We investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment laws, collective bargaining laws, and social security laws in 85 countries. We find that richer countries regulate labor less than...
Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, Christian Pop-Eleches, Andrei Shleifer
In the Anglo-American constitutional tradition, judicial checks and balances are often seen as crucial guarantees of freedom. Hayek (1960) distinguishes two ways in which the judiciary provides such...
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, Andrei Shleifer
We examine the effect of securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries. We find almost no evidence that public enforcement benefits stock markets, and strong evidence that laws...
Andrei Shleifer, Daniel Treisman
During the 1990s, Russia underwent an extraordinary transformation from a communist dictatorship to a multi-party democracy, from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, and from a...
Casey Mulligan, Andrei Shleifer
We examine the practice of military conscription around the world from the perspective of two standard theories, and a new one, which emphasizes the fixed cost of introducing and administering the...
Edward L. Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, Andrei Shleifer
We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most...
Sendhil Mullainathan, Andrei Shleifer
Persuasion is a fundamental part of social activity, yet it is rarely studied by economists. We compare the traditional economic model, in which persuasion is communication of objectively valuable...
Why Does Democracy Need Education?
Edward Glaeser, Giacomo Ponzetto, Andrei Shleifer
Across countries, education and democracy are highly correlated. We motivate empirically and then model a causal mechanism explaining this correlation. In our model, schooling teaches people to...
Coarse Thinking and Persuasion
Sendhil Mullainathan, Joshua Schwartzstein, Andrei Shleifer
We present a model of coarse thinking, in which individuals group situations into categories, and transfer the informational content of a given message from situations in a category where it is...
Debt Enforcement Around the World
Simeon Djankov, Oliver Hart, Caralee McLiesh, Andrei Shleifer
We present insolvency practitioners from 88 countries with an identical case of a hotel about to default on its debt, and ask them to describe in detail how debt enforcement against this hotel will...
The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
In the last decade, economists have produced a considerable body of research suggesting that the historical origin of a country's laws is highly correlated with a broad range of its legal rules and...
The Effect of Corporate Taxes on Investment and Entrepreneurship
Simeon Djankov, Tim Ganser, Caralee McLiesh, Rita Ramalho, Andrei Shleifer
We present new data on effective corporate income tax rates in 85 countries in 2004. The data come from a survey, conducted jointly with PricewaterhouseCoopers, of all taxes imposed on "the same"...
The Divergence of Legal Procedures
Aron Balas, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
Djankov et al. (2003a) propose and measure for 109 countries in the year 2000 an index of formalism of legal procedure for two simple disputes: eviction of a non-paying tenant and collection of a...
Anthony Niblett, Richard Posner, Andrei Shleifer
The efficiency of common law rules is central to achieving efficient resource allocation in a market economy. While many theories suggest reasons why judge-made law should tend toward efficient...
Bernheim, B Douglas, Shleifer, Andrei, Summers, Lawrence H
Although recent research suggests that intergenerational transfers play an important role in aggregate capital accumulation, our under standing of bequest motives remains incomplete. The authors...
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Cristian Pop-Eleches, Andrei Shleifer
In the Anglo-American constitutional tradition, judicial checks and balances are often seen as crucial guarantees of freedom. Hayek distinguishes two ways in which the judiciary provides such checks...
Industrialization and the Big Push.
Murphy, Kevin M, Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W
This paper explores Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan's idea that simultaneous industrialization of many sectors of the economy can be profitable for them all even when no sector can break even...
The Efficiency of Investment in the Presence of Aggregate Demand Spillovers.
Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W
In the presence of aggregate demand spillovers, an imperfectly competitive firm's profit is positively related to aggregate income, which in turn rises with profits of all firms in the economy. This...
Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer
We present a model of lawmaking by appellate courts in which judges influenced by policy preferences can distinguish precedents at some cost. We find a cost and a benefit of diversity of judicial...
Legal Determinants of External Finance,"
RAFAEL LaPORTA, FLORENCIO LOPEZ-de-SILANES, ANDREI SHLEIFER, ROBERT W. VISHNY
Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer
Following legal realists, we model the causes and consequences of trial judges exercising discretion in finding facts in a trial. We identify two motivations for the exercise of such discretion:...
Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia
Andrei Shleifer, Daniel Treisman
Recent commentators on Russia's economic reforms have almost uniformly declared them a disappointing and avoidable failure. In this book, two American scholars take a new and more balanced look at...
The Unofficial Economy and Economic Development
Rafael La Porta, Andrei Shleifer
In developing countries, informal firms (those that are not registered with the government) account for about half of all economic activity. We consider three broad views of the role of such firms in...
Philippe Aghion, Yann Algan, Pierre Cahuc, Andrei Shleifer
In a cross-section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with social capital. We document this correlation, and present a model explaining it. In the model, distrust...
Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries. Although two thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than a third make...
Debt Enforcement around the World
Simeon Djankov, Oliver Hart, Caralee McLiesh, Andrei Shleifer
Insolvency practitioners from 88 countries describe how debt enforcement will proceed against an identical hotel about to default on its debt. We use the data on time, cost, and the likely...
Djankov, Simeon, La Porta, Rafael, Shleifer, Andrei
We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries. Although two thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than a third make...
Joshua Schwartzstein, Andrei Shleifer
We ask whether regulation can usefully supplement litigation in a model of optimal social control of harmful externalities. In our model, firms choose activity levels in addition to precautions. In...
The stock market bubble of 1929: evidence from clsoed-end mutual funds
De Long, J. Bradford, Shleifer, Andrei
Economists directly observe warranted values in only a few cases. One is that of closed-end mutual funds: their fundamental value is simply the current market value of the securities that make up...
Investor Protection: Origins, Consequences, Reform
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny
. Recent research has documented large differences between countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend policies, and in the...
ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION
JACK HIRSHLEIFER, MICHAEL C. JENSEN, ROBERT E. HALL, ANDREI SHLEIFER, WILLIAM H. MECKLING
Post-Communist Reform: Pain and Progress
Olivier Jean Blanchard, Maxim Boycko, Marek Dabrowski, Rudiger Dornbusch, Richard Layard, Andrei Shleifer
In their earlier report, Reform in Eastern Europe, the WIDER group assessed the main building blocks of a successful transition in Eastern Europe: stabilization, price liberalization, privatization,...
Between 1980 and 2005, as the world embraced free market policies, living standards rose sharply, while life expectancy, educational attainment, and democracy improved and absolute poverty declined....
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
We propose a theory of financial intermediaries operating in markets influenced by investor sentiment. In our model, banks make loans, securitize these loans, trade in them, or hold cash. They can...
Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer
We present a model of judgment under uncertainty, in which an agent combines data received from the external world with information retrieved from memory to evaluate a hypothesis. We focus on what...
Philippe Aghion, Yann Algan, Pierre Cahuc, Andrei Shleifer
In a cross-section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with social capital. We document this correlation, and present a model explaining it. In the model, distrust...
La protección del inversionista y la administración corporativa
La Porta, Rafael, López De Silanes, Florencio, Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert
Recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration in publicly trade firms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend policies, and access of...
The Divergence of Legal Procedures
Aron Balas, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
Simeon Djankov et al. (2003) introduce a measure of the quality of contract enforcement -- the formalism of civil procedure -- for 109 countries as of 2000. For 40 of these countries, we compute...