Definable and contractible contracts (2009)
This paper analyzes a normal form game in which players write contracts that condition their actions on the contracts of the other players. These contracts are required to be representable in a...
Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition (2009)
This paper analyzes a voting model where (i) there is no conflict of interest among the voters, and (ii) information acquisition is costly and unobservable. The optimal mechanism is shown to be...
Evolution of time preference by natural selection (2009)
We reexamine Rogers’ (1994) analysis of the biological basis of the rate of time preference. Although his basic insight concerning the derivation of the felicity function holds up, the functional...
Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition (2009)
A group of individuals with identical preferences must make a decision under uncertainty about which decision is best. Before the decision is made, each agent can privately acquire a costly and...
Evolution of time preference by natural selection: comment (2008)
We reexamine Alan R. Rogers' (1994) analysis of the biological basis of the rate of time preference. Although his basic insight concerning the derivation of the utility function holds up, the...
Optimal information disclosure in auctions and the handicap auction (2007)
We analyse a situation where a monopolist is selling an indivisible good to risk-neutral buyers who only have an estimate of their private valuations. The seller can release, without observing,...
We develop a model of consulting (advising) where the role of the consultant is to reveal signals to her client that refine the client's original private estimate of the profitability of a project....
Compensation for quality difference in a search model of money (2005)
We study an economy in which there is always double coincidence of wants, agents have perfect information about qualities of goods, and there are no transaction costs. The hold-up problem arises...