Facchini, Giovanni, Olarreaga, Marcelo, Silva, Peri, Willmann, Gerald
This paper examines the trade policy response of Latin American governments to the rapid growth of China and India in world markets. To explain higher protection in sectors where a large share is...
Welfare Leakage and Immigration Policy (2004)
Facchini, Giovanni, Razin, Assaf, Willmann, Gerald
This paper analyzes the interaction between the welfare state and immigration policy. We establish a negative relationship between the number of dependents and the extent of the welfare state due to...
Essays on trade policy and pareto gains from trade / (2000)
Submitted to the Department of Economics.
Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing
Giovanni Facchini, Johannes Van Biesebroeck, Gerald Willmann
Structurally estimating the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model using coverage ratios that include non-tariff barriers leads to biased parameter estimates. We develop a "protection for sale"...
Protection for sale with imperfect rent capturing
Giovanni Facchini, Johannes Van Biesebroeck, Gerald Willmann
explain tariffs as the outcome of a lobbying process. In most empirical implementations of this framework protection is instead measured using non-tariff barriers. Since tariffs allow the government...
Substitutability and protectionism : Latin America's trade policy and imports from China and India
Facchini, Giovanni, Olarreaga, Marcelo, Silva, Peri, Willmann, Gerald
The authors examine the trade policy response of Latin American governments to the rapid growth of China and India in world markets. To explain higher protection in sectors where a large share is...
Substitutability and Protectionism: Latin America’s Trade Policy and Imports from China and India
Giovanni Facchini, Marcelo Olarreaga, Peri Silva, Gerald Willmann
This paper examines the trade policy response of Latin American governments to the rapid growth of China and India in world markets. To explain higher protection in sectors where a large share is...
On the Endogenous Allocation of Decision Powers in Federal Structures
This paper provides a political-economy explanation of the degree of centralization in economic policy making. To determine which policies are to be centralized, regions select representatives who...
Political Stasis or Protectionist Rut? Policy Mechanisms for Trade Reform in a Democracy
Emily Blanchard, Gerald Willmann
This paper analyzes the dynamics of trade policy reform under democracy. In an overlapping generations model, heterogeneous agents may acquire skills when young, thereby determining the skill...
On the Endogenous Allocation of Decision Powers in Federal Structures
This paper provides a political-economy explanation of the degree of centralization in economic policy making. To determine which policies are to be centralized, regions select representatives who...
Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing
Giovanni Facchini, Johannes Van Biesebroeck, Gerald Willmann
The Grossman and Helpman (1994) model explains tariffs as the outcome of a lobbying game between special interests and the government. Most empirical implementations of this framework use instead...
Asylum Seekers in Europe: The Warm Glow of a Hot Potato
Giovanni Facchini, Oliver Lorz, Gerald Willmann
The Common European Asylum System calls for increased coordination of the EU countries’ policies towards asylum seekers and refugees. In this paper, we provide a formal analysis of the effects of...
Why Legislators are Protectionists: the Role of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffs
Based on the observation that industries are often geographically concentrated, this paper proposes a new political economy model of trade protection. We associate the sectors of a specific factors...
Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing
Facchini, Giovanni, Van Biesebroeck, Johannes, Willmann, Gerald
We extend the protection for sale framework by modelling non tariff barriers. Explicitly introducing partial rent capturing leads to a testable specification that bridges the gap between the...
Substitutability and protectionism: Latin America's trade policy and imports from China and India
Facchini, Giovanni, Olarreaga, Marcelo, Silva, Peri, Willmann, Gerald
This paper examines the trade policy response of Latin American governments to the rapid growth of China and India in world markets. To explain higher protection in sectors where a large share is...
Political Stasis or Protectionist Rut? Policy Mechanisms for Trade Reform in a Democracy
Blanchard, Emily, Willmann, Gerald
This paper analyzes the dynamics of trade policy reform under democracy. In an overlapping generations model, heterogeneous agents may acquire skills when young, thereby determining the skill...
Substitutability and Protectionism: Latin America’s Trade Policy and Imports from China and India
Giovanni Facchini, Marcelo Olarreaga, Peri Silva, Gerald Willmann
This paper examines the trade policy response of Latin American governments to the rapid growth of China and India in world markets. To explain higher protection in sectors where a large share is...
Asylum seekers in Europe: the warm glow of a hot potato
Giovanni Facchini, Oliver Lorz, Gerald Willmann
Political economy, Asylum policy, Migration, J61, H77, F22,
The Customs Union issue: Why do we observe so few of them?
Giovanni Facchini, Peri Silva, Gerald Willmann
The number of preferential trade agreements has greatly increased over the past two decades, yet most existing bilateral arrangements take the form of free trade areas, and less than ten percent can...
The Customs Union Issue: Why do we Observe so few of them?
Giovanni Facchini, Peri A. Silva, Gerald Willmann
The number of preferential trade agreements has greatly increased over the past two decades, yet most existing bilateral arrangements take the form of free trade areas, and less than ten percent can...
Enlargement versus Deepening: The Trade-off Facing Economic Unions
This paper analyzes the relationship between the size of an economic union and the degree of policy centralization. We consider a political economy setting in which elected representatives bargain...
Enlargement versus Deepening: The Trade-off Facing Economic Unions
This paper analyzes the relationship between the size of an economic union and the degree of policy centralization. We consider a political economy setting in which elected representatives bargain...
Enlargement versus Deepening: The Trade-off Facing Economic Unions
This paper analyzes the relationship between the size of an economic union and the degree of policy centralization. We consider a political economy setting in which elected representatives bargain...
The Costums Unions Issue: Why do we observe so few of them?
Giovanni Facchini, Peri Silva, Gerald Willmann
The number of preferential trade agreements has greatly increased over the past two decades, yet most existing bilateral arrangements take the form of free trade areas, and less than ten percent can...
The Economics of a Multilateral Investment Agreement
This paper models a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) as a coordination device. Multinational enterprises can invest in any number of countries. Without a multilateral investment agreement,...