Playing Cournot although they shouldn’t (2005)
Fonseca, M.A., Huck, S., Normann, H.T.
In this note, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment in a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric cost. Risk dominance considerations allow to select a unique equilibrium in...
GLAD: a simple adaptive strategy that yields cooperation in dilemma games (2005)
Huck, S., Normann, H.T., Oechssler, J.
We introduce a simple adaptive rule where agents choose a cooperative effort on a grid. Agents can adjust this effort step by step and G ains and L osses A djust D irections. We show that this...
Strategic delegation in experimental markets (2004)
Huck, S., Muller, W., Normann, H.T.
In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different contracts, which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers...
Two are few and four are many: number effects in experimental oligopolies (2004)
Huck, S., Normann, H.T., Oechssler, J.
In this paper we investigate how the competitiveness of Cournot markets varies with the number of firms in an industry. We review previous Cournot experiments in the literature. Additionally, we...
Zero-knowledge cooperation in dilemma games (2003)
Huck, S., Normann, H.T., Oechssler, J.
We consider a very simple adaptive rule that induces cooperative behavior in a large class of dilemma games. The rule has a Pavlovian flavor and can be described as win–continue, lose–reverse. It...
Job market signaling and screening: an experimental comparison (2003)
Muller, W., Kubler, D., Normann, H.T.
We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets. We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the e.ect of increasing the number of employers from two to three. In all...
Stability of the Cournot process - experimental evidence (2002)
Huck, S., Normann, H.T., Oechssler, J.
We report results of experiments designed to test the predictions of the best-reply process. In a Cournot oligopoly with four firms, the best-reply process should theoretically explode if demand and...
To commit or not to commit: endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets (2002)
Huck, S., Muller, W., Normann, H.T.
In this paper we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990, Games Econ. Behavior2, 29–46). In their duopoly game firms can choose their...
Vertical Integration with Capital Precommitment: Monopolization vs. Long-Run Inefficiency.
Baake, P., Kamecke, U., Normann, H.T.
We analyze the impact of vertical integration when a monopolistic producer can make a capital commitment before deciding on output.
Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure with Convex Downstream Costs.
Baake, P., Kamecke, U., Normann, H.T.
In a framework with an upstream monopoly and downstream duopoly, we analyze the impact of vertical integration when downstream firms have convex costs.
Capacity Cjoices and Price Competition in Experimental Market.
Anderhub, V., Guth, W., Kamecke, U., Normann, H.T.
In the heterogeneous experimental oligopoly markets of this paper, sellers first choose capacities and then prices. In equilibrium, capacities should correspond to the Cournot prediction. In the...
Job market signaling and screening: an experimental comparison
Muller, W., Kubler, D., Normann, H.T.
We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets. We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the e.ect of increasing the number of employers from two to three. In all...
Conjectural Variations and Evolutionary Stability: A New Rationale for Consistency.
consistent conjectures;
Job Market Signalling and Screening: An Experimental Comparison.
Kubler, D., Müller, W., Normann, H.T.
We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets.We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the e®ect of increasing the number of employers from two to three.In all...
Endogenous Timing in Duopoly: Experimental Evidence.
Fonseca, M.A., Müller, W., Normann, H.T.
In this paper we experimentally investigate the extended game with observable delay of Hamilton and Slutsky (Games Econ.Beh., 1990).Firms bindingly announce a production period (one out of two...