Course Description Syllabus- Economics 713, Part 1 (2008)
Prof William, H. Sandholm, Andreu Mas-colell, Michael D. Whinston, Jerry R. Green, Drew Fudenberg, ...
Economics 713 is a semester long course on game theory and information economics. I will teach the first half of the course (mostly game theory) and Jo Hertel will teach the second half (mostly...
LEARNING AND MODEL VALIDATION (2008)
Abstract. This paper studies the following problem. An agent takes actions based on a possibly misspecified model. The agent is large, in the sense that his actions influence the model he is trying...
Learning to be Credible (2007)
This paper was prepared for presentation at the conference to celebrate the Bank of
Neural Networks for Encoding and Adapting in Dynamic Economies (2007)
this paper draw heavily on materials in chapters 3 and 4 of Sargent's Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics, Oxford University Press, 1993. 2 Neural Networks for Encoding and Adapting in Dynamic...
Optimization and the price of anarchy in a dynamic newsboy model (2005)
This paper examines a dynamic version of the newsboy problem in which a decision maker must maintain service capacity from several sources to attempt to meet uncertain demand for a perishable good,...
Optimization and the price of anarchy in a dynamic newsboy model (2005)
This paper examines a dynamic version of the newsboy problem in which a decision maker must maintain service capacity from several sources to attempt to meet uncertain demand for a perishable good,...
Escaping Nash Inflation (2002)
In-koo Cho, Noah Williams, J. Sargent, Michael Harrison
ABSTRACT. Mean dynamics describe the convergence to self-confirming equilibria of selfreferential systems under discounted least squares learning. Escape dynamics recurrently propel away from a...
Escaping Nash Inflation (2000)
In-Koo Cho, Thomas J. Sargent, Working Pa, Working Pa, Thoma J. Sa, Thoma J. Sa, ...
this paper obtains analytical characterizations of those escape dynamics.
Escaping Nash Inflation (1999)
In-koo Cho, Thomas J. Sargent, Michael Harrison
Mean dynamics govern convergence to rational expectations equilibria of self-referential systems under least squares learning. We highlight escape dynamics that propel away from a rational...
Learning to be Credible (1997)
This paper was prepared for presentation at the conference to celebrate the Bank of Portugal's 150
Neural Networks for Encoding and Adapting in Dynamic Economies (1995)
this paper draw heavily on materials in chapters 3 and 4 of Sargent's Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics, Oxford University Press, 1993. 2 Neural Networks for Encoding and Adapting in Dynamic...
Refinement of sequential equilibrium : theory and application / (1986)
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 1986.
Neural networks for encoding and adapting in dynamic economies
Cho, In-Koo, Sargent, Thomas J., H. M. Amman, D. A. Kendrick, J. Rust
We study a simple, microfounded macroeconomic system in which the monetary authority employs a Taylor-type policy rule. We analyze situations in which the self-confirming equilibrium is unique and...
Mean dynamics govern convergence to rational expectations equilibria of self-referential systems under least squares learning. We highlight escape dynamics that propel away from a rational...
LEARNING DYNAMICS AND ENDOGENOUS CURRENCY CRISES
This paper introduces adaptive learning into the third-generation currency crisis model of Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2001, Currency crises and monetary policy in an economy with credit...
Learning Dynamics and Endogenous Currency Crises
Learning, Large Deviations, Currency Crises
We study a simple, microfounded macroeconomic system in which the monetary authority employs a Taylor-type policy rule. We analyze situations in which the self-confirming equilibrium is unique and...
Discussion of Evans and Honkapohja, "Policy interaction, expectations, and the liquidity trap"
The result of Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001) is powerful because it relies only on three rather natural conditions: the Fisher equation, the convex Taylor rule, and the lower bound of the...
We examine whether the Coase conjecture [7, 14, 4, 10] is robust against slight ability of commitment of the monopolist not to sell the durable goods to consumers. We quantify the commitment ability...
Cho, In-Koo, Williams, Noah, Sargent, Thomas J
An ordinary differential equation (ODE) gives the mean dynamics that govern the convergence to self-confirming equilibria of self-referential systems under discounted least squares learning. Another...
Stationarity, Rationalizability and Bargaining.
Without assuming rational expectations, the author examines the implications of a stationarity assumption in a standard bargaining model with one-sided incomplete information, where the seller makes...
Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining.
This paper investigates the relationship between uncertainty and delay of agreement in the one-sided offer bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty where the seller makes offers. The author...
Monotonicity and Rationalizability in a Large First Price Auction
This paper proves that the monotonicity of bidding strategies together with the rationality of bidders implies that the winning bid in a first price auction converges to the competitive equilibrium...
A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium.
The author proposes a refinement of seq uential equilibrium for extensive form games by generalizing a restri ction proposed for signaling games in Cho and D. M. Kreps (1987). The restriction is that...
Competitive Equilibrium in a Radial Network.
In a competitive market over a network with finite capacity, we can focus without loss of generality on simple allocations, where the net transaction over a link is equal to the gross transaction...
This paper studies the following problem. An agent takes actions based on a possibly misspecified model. The agent is 'large', in the sense that his actions influence the model he is trying to learn...
How complex are networks playing repeated games?
This paper examines implications of complexity cost in implementing repeated game strategies through networks with finitely many classifiers. A network consists of individual classifiers that...
On the Complexity of Repeated Principal Agent Games.
We examine an infinitely repeated principal agent game without discounting (Radner [1985]), in which the agent may engage in multiple projects. We focus on "linear" strategies that summarize each...
Bounded Rationality, Neural Network and Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting.
The perfect folk theorem (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986) need not rely on excessively complex strategies. We recover the perfect folk theorem for two person repeated games with discounting through...
research articles : A simple model of coalitional bidding
Rajiv Vohra, In-Koo Cho, Kevin Jewell
We analyze a model of coalitional bidding in which coalitions form endogenously and compete with each other. Since the nature of this competition influences the way in which agents organize...
On the complexity of repeated principal agent games
We examine an infinitely repeated principal agent game without discounting (Radner [1985] ), in which the agent may engage in multiple projects. We focus on "linear" strategies that summarize each...
Strategic Stability in Repeated Signaling Games.
This paper extends selection rules now used in the signaling literature (such as the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) to a class of repeated signaling games, where each player can exchange...
Market Power and Network Constraint in a Deregulated Electricity Market
This paper investigates the market power and the welfare performance of the deregulated wholesale electricity market of California between 1998 and 2000 by incorporating the structure of the...