Vinayak Borkar, Kaustubh Deshmukh, Sunita Sarawagi
segmentation of text into structured records
Vinayak Borkar, Kaustubh Deshmukh, Sunita Sarawagi
segmentation of text into structured records
Kaustubh Deshmukh, Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin
Abstract In this paper we consider the problem of designing a mechanism for double auctions where bidders each bid to buy or sell one unit of a single commodity. We assume that each bidder's...
Priti Shankar, Amitava Dasgupta, Kaustubh Deshmukh, B. Sundar Rajan
Block codes are viewed from a formal language theoretic perspective. It is shown that properties of trellises for subclasses of block codes called rectangular codes follow naturally from the Myhill...
On viewing block codes as finite automata (2003)
Shankar, Priti, Dasgupta, Amitava, Deshmukh, Kaustubh, Rajan, Sundar B
Block codes are viewed from a formal language theoretic perspective. It is shown that properties of trellises for subclasses of block codes called rectangular codes follow naturally from the Myhill...
On viewing block codes as finite automata (2003)
Shankar, Priti, Dasgupta, Amitava, Deshmukh, Kaustubh, Rajan, Sundar B
Block codes are viewed from a formal language theoretic perspective. It is shown that properties of trellises for subclasses of block codes called rectangular codes follow naturally from the Myhill...
Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions (2002)
Kaustubh Deshmukh, Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin
1 Introduction Dynamic pricing mechanisms, and specifically auctions with multiple buyers and sellers, are becoming increasing popular in electronic commerce. We consider double auctions in which...
Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions (2002)
Kaustubh Deshmukh, Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin
1 Introduction Dynamic pricing mechanisms, and specifically auctions with multiple buyers and sellers, are becoming increasing popular in electronic commerce. We consider double auctions in which...
Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions (2002)
Kaustubh Deshmukh, Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin
Abstract In this paper we consider the problem of designing a mechanism for double auctions where bidders each bid to buy or sell one unit of a single commodity. We assume that each bidder’s...
Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions (2002)
Kaustubh Deshmukh, Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin
In this paper we consider the problem of designing a mechanism for double auctions where bidders each bid to buy or sell one unit of a single commodity. We assume that each bidder's utility...
On the Many Faces of Block Codes (2000)
Deshmukh, Kaustubh, Shankar, Priti, Dasgupta, Amitava, Rajan, Sundar B
Block codes are first viewed as finite state automata represented as trellises. A technique termed subtrellis overlaying is introduced with the object of reducing decoder complexity. Necessary and...
On the Many Faces of Block Codes (2000)
Deshmukh, Kaustubh, Shankar, Priti, Dasgupta, Amitava, Rajan, Sundar B
Block codes are first viewed as finite state automata represented as trellises. A technique termed subtrellis overlaying is introduced with the object of reducing decoder complexity. Necessary and...
Automatically extracting structure from free text addresses (2000)
Vinayak R. Borkar, Kaustubh Deshmukh, Sunita Sarawagi
In this paper we present a novel way to automatically elementize postal addresses seen as a plain text string into atomic structured elements like ”City ” and ”Street name”. This is an...
On the many faces of block codes (2000)
Kaustubh Deshmukh, Priti Shankar, Amitava Dasgupta, B. Sundar Rajan
Abstract. Block codes are first viewed as finite state automata represented as trellises. A technique termed subtrellis overlaying is introduced with the object of reducing decoder complexity....