Envy-Free Makespan Approximation (2009)
Cohen, Edith, Feldman, Michal, Fiat, Amos, Kaplan, Haim, Olonetsky, Svetlana
We study envy-free mechanisms for scheduling tasks on unrelated machines (agents) that approximately minimize the makespan. For indivisible tasks, we put forward an envy-free poly-time mechanism that...
Computing an Optimal Contract in Simple Technologies (2009)
We study an economic setting in which a principal motivates a team of strategic agents to exert costly effort toward the success of a joint project. The action taken by each agent is hidden and...
Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency [Extended Abstract] (2009)
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan
Abstract. We study a setting where a principal needs to motivate a team of agents whose combination of hidden efforts stochastically determines an outcome. In a companion paper we devise and study a...
On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections (2009)
Caragiannis, Ioannis, Covey, Jason, Feldman, Michal, Homan, Christopher, Kaklamanis, Christos, Karanikolas, Nikos, ...
The voting rules proposed by Dodgson and Young are both designed to nd the alternative closest to being a Condorcet winner, according to two di erent notions of proximity; the score of a given...
The Misperception of Norms: The Psychology of Bias and the Economics of Equilibrium (2008)
Cooter, Robert D, Feldman, Michal, Feldman, Yuval
This study combines the psychology of bias and the economics of equilibrium. We focus on two of the most discussed perceptual biases found by psychologists who studied the role social norms in...
The Misperception of Norms: The Psychology of Bias and the Economics of Equilibrium (2008)
Cooter, Robert D, Feldman, Michal, Feldman, Yuval
This study combines the psychology of bias and the economics of equilibrium. We focus on two of the most discussed perceptual biases found by psychologists who studied the role social norms in...
Abstract Combinatorial Agency (2008)
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan
We study a combinatorial variant of the classical principal-agent problem. In our setting a principal must motivate a team of strategic agents to exert costly effort on his behalf, but their actions...
Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency (2008)
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan
Abstract. We study a setting where a principal needs to motivate a team of agents whose combination of hidden efforts stochastically determines an outcome. In a companion paper we devise and study a...
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman
Much recent research concerns systems, such as the Internet, whose components are owned and operated by different parties, each with his own “selfish ” goal. The field of Algorithmic Mechanism...
Abstract Strong Price of Anarchy ∗ (2008)
Nir Andelman, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour
A strong equilibrium (Aumann 1959) is a pure Nash equilibrium which is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We define the strong price of anarchy to be the ratio of the worst case strong...
Efficient Graph Topologies in Network Routing Games ∗ (2008)
Amir Epstein, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour
In this work we explore the topological structure of networks that guarantee that any routing of selfish users is efficient, i.e., any Nash equilibrium achieves the social optimum. We distinguish...
Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency (2008)
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan
Abstract. We study a setting where a principal needs to motivate a team of agents whose combination of hidden efforts stochastically determines an outcome. In a companion paper we devise and study a...
Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency [Extended Abstract] (2008)
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan
Abstract. We study a setting where a principal needs to motivate a team of agents whose combination of hidden efforts stochastically determines an outcome. In a companion paper [2] we devise and...
In this paper we formulate the fixed budget resource allocation game to understand the performance of a distributed marketbased resource allocation system. Multiple users decide how to distribute...
Abstract Combinatorial Agency (2008)
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan
Much recent research concerns systems, such as the Internet, whose components are owned and operated by different parties with different “selfish ” goals. The field of Algorithmic Mechanism...
Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency [Extended Abstract] (2008)
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan
Abstract. We study a setting where a principal needs to motivate a team of agents whose combination of hidden efforts stochastically determines an outcome. In a companion paper we devise and study a...
In multi-hop networks, the actions taken by individual intermediate nodes are typically hidden from the communicating endpoints; all the endpoints can observe is whether or not the end-to-end...
Cooperation is a central tenet of peer-to-peer systems. Without cooperation, users of a file-sharing system such as Gnutella suffer long download delays, if they are able to download at all [1]....
Lack of cooperation (free riding) is one of the key problems that confronts today’s P2P systems. What makes this problem particularly difficult is the unique set of challenges that P2P systems...
Service Differentiation in Web Caching and Content Distribution (2007)
Abstract—Service differentiation in web caching and content distribution will result in significant technical and economic efficiency gains, to the benefit of both content publishers and service...
Lack of cooperation (free riding) is one of the key problems that confronts today’s P2P systems. What makes this problem particularly difficult is the unique set of challenges that P2P systems...
Approximability and Inapproximability of Dodgson and Young Elections (2007)
Ariel D. Procaccia, Michal Feldman, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Ariel D. Procaccia, Michal Feldman, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
The voting rules proposed by Dodgson and Young are both designed to find the candidate closest to being a Condorcet winner, according to two different notions of proximity; the score of a given...
Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games (2007)
In this work we study cost sharing connection games, where each player has a source and sink he would like to connect, and the cost of the edges is either shared equally (fair connection games) or in...
Strong price of anarchy (2007)
Nir Andelman, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour
A strong equilibrium (Aumann 1959) is a pure Nash equilibrium which is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We define the strong price of anarchy to be the ratio of the worst case strong...
Approximability and Inapproximability of Dodgson and Young Elections (2007)
Ariel D. Procaccia, Michal Feldman, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
The voting rules proposed by Dodgson and Young are both designed to find the candidate closest to being a Condorcet winner, according to two different notions of proximity; the score of a given...
Strong price of anarchy (2007)
Nir Andelman, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour
A strong equilibrium (Aumann 1959) is a pure Nash equilibrium which is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We define the strong price of anarchy to be the ratio of the worst case strong...
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan
Much recent research concerns systems, such as the Internet, whose components are owned and operated by different parties, each with his own “selfish ” goal. The field of Algorithmic Mechanism...
Implementation with a bounded action space (2006)
Michal Feldman, Liad Blumrosen, Michal Feldman
While traditional mechanism design typically assumes isomorphism between the agents’ type- and action spaces, in many situations the agents face strict restrictions on their action space due to,...
Implementation with a bounded action space (2006)
Liad Blumrosen, Michal Feldman
While traditional mechanism design typically assumes isomorphism between the agents ’ type- and action spaces, in many situations the agents face strict restrictions on their action space due to,...
Implementation with a bounded action space (2006)
Liad Blumrosen, Michal Feldman
While traditional mechanism design typically assumes isomorphism between the agents’ type- and action spaces, in many situations the agents face strict restrictions on their action space due to,...
Implementation with a bounded action space (2006)
Liad Blumrosen, Michal Feldman
Abstract While traditional mechanism design typically assumes isomorphism between the agents'type- and action spaces, in many situations the agents face strict restrictions on their action
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan
We study a combinatorial variant of the classical principal-agent model. In our setting a principal wishes to motivate a team of strategic agents to exert costly effort on his behalf, but their...
Overcoming Free-riding Behavior in Peer-to-Peer Systems (2005)
While the fundamental premise of peer-to-peer (P2P) systems is that of voluntary resource sharing among individual peers, there is an inherent tension between individual rationality and collective...
Free-Riding and Whitewashing in Peer-to-Peer Systems (2004)
Michal Feldman, Christos Papadimitriou, John Chuang
Abstract – We devise a simple model to study the phenomenon of free-riding and the effect of free identities on user behavior in peer-to-peer systems. At the heart of our model is a strategic user...
Free-Riding and Whitewashing in Peer-to-Peer Systems (2004)
We develop a model to study the phenomenon of free-riding in peer-to-peer (P2P) systems. At the heart of our model is a user of a certain type, an intrinsic and private parameter that reflects the...
John Chuang, Nicolas Christin, Michal Feldman, Jens Grossklags, Kevin Lai (hp, ...
� This talk is NOT about the economic impact or legitimacy of P2P file sharing � See: � Oberholzer & Strumpf, P2P’s Impact on Recorded Music Sales.
The Misperception of Norms: The Psychology of Bias and the Economics of Equilibrium
Robert Cooter, Michal Feldman, Yuval Feldman
This study combines the psychology of bias and the economics of equilibrium. We focus on two of the most discussed perceptual biases found by psychologists who studied the role social norms in...
Efficient graph topologies in network routing games
Epstein, Amir, Feldman, Michal, Mansour, Yishay
A topology is efficient for network games if, for any game over it, every Nash equilibrium is socially optimal. It is well known that many topologies are not efficient for network games. We...
Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
Epstein, Amir, Feldman, Michal, Mansour, Yishay
We study network games in which each player wishes to connect his source and sink, and the cost of each edge is shared among its users either equally (in Fair Connection Games--FCG's) or arbitrarily...
The Misperception of Norms: The Psychology of Bias and the Economics of Equilibrium
Robert D. Cooter, Michal Feldman, Yuval Feldman
This study combines the psychology of bias and the economics of equilibrium. We focus on two of the most discussed perceptual biases found by psychologists who studied the role social norms in...